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Abstract 
 It is well established that conversational partners jointly establish brief labels for 
repeatedly mentioned entities. When speaking to a new partner who is unfamiliar with the 
labels, speakers use longer expressions to facilitate understanding. How this process of 
audience design scales up to conversations among three or more individuals is unknown. 
Further, while memory is thought to play an essential role in audience design, the link 
between memory for language and language use is not well explored. This dissertation 
consists of two parts that examine these two issues. In Chapter 2, I propose, and test, 
potential hypotheses regarding how speakers design referring expressions in multiparty 
conversation. The results of four experiments help to elucidate the mechanisms that 
support audience design in multiparty conversation. In Chapter 3, I explore the memory 
contributions to the referential phenomenon of lexical differentiation, aiming to 
understand the relationship between memory for discourse referents in dialogue and 
referential form. The results of three experiments provide insights into how memory for 
the discourse history guides language use during conversation. Taken together, these 
findings allow us to better understand the mechanisms of audience design and the 
interplay between language use and memory in conversation. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 It is well-established in studies of two-party conversation that interlocutors jointly 
establish brief labels when repeatedly referring to a series of entities (Brennan & Clark, 
1996; Schober & Clark, 1989; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Isaacs & Clark, 1987; 
Krauss & Weinheimer, 1964, 1966; Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992; Van der Wege, 2009; 
Yoon & Brown-Schmidt, 2014). This process, sometimes referred to as lexical 
entrainment (Brennan & Clark, 1996), is thought to reflect the establishment of partner-
specific, joint knowledge for these labels.  
 Speakers are sensitive to their partner’s knowledge state and accommodate their 
utterances accordingly. This process of designing utterances to meet the communicative 
needs of one’s addressee is a process generally known as audience design (Clark, 1996, 
also see Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974). For example, in a situation when 
conversational partners establish joint labels for a series of entities, and then one of the 
partners later speaks to a new partner, the original partner tends to produce longer, more 
elaborated expressions when speaking to the new partner who lacks knowledge of the 
lexically entrained terms (Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992; Horton & Spieler, 2007; also see 
Horton & Gerrig, 2002; 2005; Heller, et al., 2012). Such findings are consistent with a 
broader set of results that speakers tailor expressions based on the knowledge state of the 
current addressee (Isaacs & Clark, 1987; Brennan & Clark, 1996; Bromme, Jucks, & 
Wagner, 2005), rather than their own egocentric knowledge (cf. Horton & Keysar, 1996). 
One question that has been relatively less explored is how audience design in two-party 
conversation scales up to multiparty conversation—conversation among three or more 
individuals. This is the question that I will address in Chapter 2.  
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The second question is how interlocutors formulate memory representations to 
support successful audience design during conversation. Memory for what is and is not 
jointly known is necessary in order for speakers to tailor their utterances based on the 
knowledge and perspective of the addressee. Successful audience design may depend on 
the degree to which these representations are accessible in memory (Horton & Gerrig, 
2005). If a speaker fails to remember what they have said in the past, they might repeat 
this information to the same addressee multiple times, thus making conversation 
inefficient and redundant. In spite of obvious ties between memory and language use, 
little research has examined the link between memory for language and language use. 
Thus, in Chapter 3, I present the findings of three experiments that examine the link 
between memory for discourse referents in dialogue, and referential form. 
 The current series of experiments form two streams of research that aim to 
address the two questions mentioned above. In Chapter 2 (Experiments 1-4), I test 
potential hypotheses regarding how speakers design referring expressions in multiparty 
conversation. In Chapter 3 (Experiments 5-7), I explore the nature of the memory 
representations that support language use in dialogue and examine potential asymmetries 
between speakers and listeners in the memorial representation of the discourse record. 
In what follows, I review existing research on multiparty conversation and raise questions 
about whether speakers maintain distinct representations of common ground for each 
individual, or whether these representations are blended during multiparty conversation.  
I then review the literature in the language and memory traditions, to set the stage for 
exploration of the link between memory for language and language use.  
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Multiparty Conversation 
 The literature on two-party conversation demonstrates that speakers adjust 
language use based on the knowledge of their conversational partner. However, it is 
largely unknown how these processes scale up to communication in multiparty 
conversation. Multiparty conversation, in which more than two individuals converse, 
presents complexities for the speaker due to the fact that the joint knowledge held 
between any two pairs of individuals within the larger group necessarily differs. After all, 
each individual brings to a conversation their own perspective and beliefs. As a result, the 
pairings of individuals within the larger group differ in the knowledge that is mutually 
known1. In such situations, a speaker may address multiple addressees at once, or may 
direct utterances to only one of several potential addressees. Whether speakers can 
maintain separate representations of joint knowledge for multiple potential addressees in 
such situations is relatively unexplored. Likewise, little is known about the ways in which 
speakers design utterances for multiple individuals. Multiparty conversation is an 
important test case because multiparty communication is common in day-to-day life. 
Moreover, the ways in which speakers approach the problem of audience design in 
multiparty conversation can provide insights into the underlying mechanisms of audience 
design, including those mechanisms at work in two-party conversation. 
In one study that examined audience design in three-party conversation, a speaker 
simultaneously designed utterances for two addressees who shared distinct degrees of 
common ground with the speaker (Yoon & Brown-Schmidt, 2014). In the first phase of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!Critically, mutual knowledge differs from knowledge that two individuals happen to share in 
that they know each other knows (see Clark & Marshall, 1978; 1981). In the current experiments, 
the relevant mutual, or joint knowledge is the knowledge of the object labels that is acquired 
during the task-based conversation.!!
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the task, the speaker first established brief labels for a series of abstract images with one 
partner while the second partner waited in another room. In the second phase, the speaker 
referred to the same images again, addressing either the same (knowledgeable) partner 
alone, or addressing both the knowledgeable partner and the naïve partner at the same 
time. During this second phase, speakers continued to use the brief labels when speaking 
to the knowledgeable partner. By contrast, when simultaneously addressing the 
knowledgeable and the naïve partners, speakers produced longer descriptions. These 
findings show that speakers are sensitive to the presence of a naïve addressee in three-
party conversation. What these findings do not specify, however, is how speakers 
approach the task of audience design in multiparty settings. This is the focus of the first 
part of the present research (Chapter 2: Experiments 1-4). 
Distinctiveness and Flexibility 
In order to tailor language use to the knowledge of a particular individual in a 
multiparty setting, the speaker must maintain distinct representations of the joint 
knowledge shared with each partner. Moreover, speakers must be able to draw on these 
representations in a partner-specific manner, such that utterances designed for one partner 
are based on the joint knowledge held with that person, and not influenced by joint 
knowledge held with others. The open question, then, is whether speakers are capable of 
maintaining and using distinct, partner-specific representations in such a way. 
Initial evidence from studies in which a speaker address a naïve partner (Wilkes-
Gibbs & Clark, 1992; Yoon & Brown-Schmidt, 2014), or discuss a new piece of 
information with a familiar partner (Heller, et al., 2012; Horton & Gerrig, 2002; 2005) 
show that speakers can detect one addressee’s lack of knowledge, and adjust accordingly. 
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Less clear, however, is whether speakers can maintain distinct representations of the task-
relevant joint knowledge for different individuals in the same setting, particularly when 
neither partner is naïve.  
Evidence consistent with the idea that speakers may face difficulty in maintaining 
distinct representations comes from studies in which speakers share some knowledge 
with one partner and different knowledge with another partner. Horton and Gerrig (2005) 
examined dialogues in which a speaker named a series of images with partner A, and then 
a different series of images with partner B. Speakers then described all the images for 
partner A alone. When describing images that were new to partner A, speakers provided 
extra details, demonstrating audience design. However, speakers were less successful 
when the images shared with the two partners were from the same category (e.g., frogs vs. 
different frogs) than when the images associated with the two partners were from distinct 
categories (e.g., fish vs. frogs). These findings highlight the role that memory processes 
play in constraining the process of audience design: If the appropriate partner-specific 
knowledge is difficult to access, audience design may suffer. 
Thus, in a more taxing context, such as when a speaker must alternate addressing 
one of two co-present partners, each of whom holds partial knowledge of the topic at 
hand, appropriately designing utterances for each partner may prove too difficult. While 
in one study, young adults were able to alternate designing utterances for a familiar 
partner, and a new, naive partner (Horton & Spieler, 2007), that study used a non-
interactive test where partners were represented by photographs. It is not clear if this 
ability to switch between partner representations would extend to live conversation. A 
contributing factor is that it may take time and effort to access the relevant common 
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ground representations associated with the current addressee. Switching costs are well-
established in a variety of cognitive domains (Rogers & Monsell, 1995), including spatial 
perspective-taking (Ryskin, et al., 2014). Moreover, recall of items in memory may often 
be clustered (Herrmann & Pearle, 1981) such that participants may prefer to stick with 
one type of recall for stretches at a time, rather than switching (see Young, 2004). Given 
these findings, having to switch between accessing the relevant memorial representations 
of common ground held with the multiple different matchers may be too taxing for 
audience design to proceed appropriately.  
There are two potential ways in which speakers might maintain representations of 
joint knowledge in cases where each of two partners has some knowledge (Figure 1.1). 
For example, consider a situation in which a speaker discusses an unusual image once 
with the first partner, but discusses the same image four times with a second partner, 
establishing a lexically entrained term (e.g., the 3d chair). The first partner would have a 
low degree of common ground (CG) for the entrained term, whereas the second partner 
would have high-CG for the same term. If speakers maintain distinct representations of 
joint knowledge, speakers should describe the image in more detail for the partner with 
low-CG, whereas they should produce the short entrained term with the high-CG partner. 
Alternatively, speakers may have difficulty maintaining distinct representations of the 
two partners. If so, non-distinct representations of common ground would result in 
expressions that are not tailored for either individual, and possibly reflect the overall 
knowledge of both partners.   
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Figure 1.1. Left panel: In multiparty conversation, the speaker (blue face) jointly 
discusses a novel image 4x with one partner (purple face), but only 1x with another 
partner (white face). Center panel: The speaker forms distinct representations of the joint 
knowledge held with each partner, and designs utterances accordingly. Right panel: The 
speaker forms non-distinct representations for the set of addressees. 
  
Moreover, even if distinct representations are maintained, it is unclear whether 
speakers can flexibly alternate between these representations, as in the case where a 
speaker alternates addressing one partner and then the other partner in a multiparty 
setting. According to one proposal (Horton, 2007), people serve as contextual memory 
cues for retrieval of information that is associated with them, even in situations that are 
not overtly communicative. If so, in cases where multiple partners are present in the 
context, it may be difficult to access the representations of joint knowledge associated 
with the intended addressee, as information associated with the non-intended addressee 
may become automatically activated as well.  
Audience design in multiparty conversation 
How do speakers design utterances for more than one individual? Three potential 
approaches that speakers can pursue in multiparty conversation were examined for this 
question in Experiment 2. One approach to audience design in these settings is for 
speakers to Aim low (Figure 1.2., top left), such that in situations with multiple 
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addressees, the speaker designs utterances to match the knowledge state of the least 
knowledgeable person. Aiming low would have the benefit of ensuring that all addressees 
would understand what was said, and would be generally consistent with findings that 
speakers design longer expressions when speaking to a naïve individual in dialogue 
(Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992; Horton & Spieler, 2007).  
 
Figure 1.2. Candidate approaches to audience design in multiparty conversation. 
 
 Alternatively, speakers may Combine knowledge state of the addressees (Figure 
1.2., top middle), and plan utterances with respect to a combination of the knowledge 
states. This approach is similar to the proposal that when engaging in audience design, 
speakers bring to mind a generic addressee (see Dell & Brown, 1991). The advantage of 
an combining strategy would be that it may balance the needs of the two addressees, such 
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that the less-knowledgeable addressee would be able to follow along (with some effort), 
without distracting the more knowledgeable addressee with unnecessary details (see 
Engelhardt, Bailey, & Ferreira, 2006). Note that there are multiple possibilities for how 
knowledge states might be combined; we return to this issue in the general discussion. 
A final possibility is that speakers Aim high (Figure 1.2., top right), and design 
utterances for the most knowledgeable addressee. One reason to think that speakers may 
adopt this approach is evidence that while speakers do engage in audience design, they 
also overattribute knowledge to the addressee when the speaker themselves is more 
knowledgeable (Fussell & Krauss, 1991; 1992). 
So far, I have proposed three candidate approaches for how speakers design 
utterances in multiparty conversation. However, it is less clear whether speakers always 
pursue one approach or flexibly switch strategies based on contextual pressures such as 
the number of addressees in a group or their knowledge states. In multiparty conversation 
where each addressee holds a different amount of common ground, addressees may have 
distinct needs depending on their background knowledge (knowledgeable vs. naïve). 
Successful communication with knowledgeable addressees might require conversational 
efficiency—a brief, established label (e.g., the 3d chair) might be the quickest way to 
achieve reference with a partner who shares common ground for the object labels. In 
contrast, successful communication with a naïve addressee might demand an emphasis on 
conversational informativity –the use of long and descriptive labels that provide all of the 
critical information needed to understand a reference to an object label for the first time 
(e.g., it looks like a 3-dimensional chair… with long legs… ). If a speaker were to 
emphasize informativity, this may take extra time and effort, but the speaker could be 
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assured that every member of the conversation would be able to understand the intended 
message. For instance, imagine a situation where two research assistants working in the 
same laboratory talk about coding data. In such a situation they would not need to discuss 
the basics of the coding process, since they both know this information already. In this 
case, they are likely to skip discussion of this background information, and focus on the 
new details. This is an example where conversational partners use their common ground 
to have an efficient conversation. In contrast, imagine a situation where a new research 
assistant joins the lab. In this situation the existing (knowledgeable) RA should give 
detailed instructions to the new person when talking about the basic aspects of the data 
coding process. This is an example where the speaker (the knowledgeable RA) 
emphasizes informativity at the expense of efficiency.  
In multiparty conversation, speakers must strike a balance between two distinct 
communicative pressures: informativity and efficiency. When speaking to a group of 
addressees who vary in their background knowledge, emphasizing only informativity or 
only efficiency may cause some of the addressees to become bored or alternatively, 
confused. As a result, speakers in multiparty conversation may need to estimate and 
combine the addressees’ background knowledge to design their utterances with respect to 
the demands of multiple individuals. How speakers deal with addressees who have 
conflicting needs is not well understood. Thus, in Experiments 3 and 4, I examine how 
speakers cope with the needs of different addressees in multiparty conversation, whether 
they continue to use one approach or flexibly switch to different approaches depending 
on the conversational context.  
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Memory for the discourse history 
 Multiple types of memorial representations are likely to be relevant to the 
audience design process, including memory for the content of what was said, or item 
memory (e.g. the fact that “I got the job” was said), as well as memory for contextual 
information. The relevant context for a conversation likely includes information about 
whom one’s conversational partner is (see Brown-Schmidt, Yoon, & Ryskin, 2015), the 
relevant information that was discussed in the past (sometimes called the historical 
discourse context, Brennan & Clark, 1996), as well as information in the immediate 
context.  While it is broadly understood that successful audience design depends on 
access to the relevant memory representations (e.g., Horton & Gerrig, 2005a, b; Knutsen 
& Le Bigot, 2012), the link between memory for language and language use has been less 
explored.  
Research in the language tradition 
Traditional approaches to language processing separately examine the processes 
of language production and language comprehension (e.g., Levelt, 1993; Townsend & 
Bever, 2001). Motivation for the separate investigation of production and comprehension 
processes include claims that language production and comprehension are modular 
(Fodor, 1983) such that the two processing systems are independent and do not 
themselves interact. A traditional neurolinguistic model, such as the Lichtheim-Broca-
Wernicke model, also supported distinct processing associated with production and 
comprehension, based on the idea that production and comprehension deficits in aphasia 
were linked to damage to different brain areas (Lichtheim, 1885; Ben Shalom & Poeppel, 
2008). 
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More recently, the idea that language production and comprehension are 
interwoven has gained interest, as have methodologies that support the simultaneous 
investigation of language production and comprehension in conversation (e.g., Trueswell 
& Tanenhaus, 2005; Richardson & Dale, 2005; Richardson, Dale, & Kirkham, 2007; 
Award, Warren, Scott, Turkheimer, & Wise, 2007). For example, Pickering and Garrod 
(2004; 2013) proposed that production and comprehension are tightly interwoven actions 
that draw on the same core representations at all levels of language processing including 
phonology, semantics, and syntax. According to their model, production and 
comprehension are not two separate systems, but inextricably linked together. Evidence 
in support of this claim includes findings that interlocutors are highly likely to take turns 
without delays during a daily conversation. If production and comprehension involved 
two separate systems, it would be difficult to maintain a stream of conversation without 
temporal delays in turn-taking. Recent neurobiological data supports this claim, showing 
that brain areas activated during production and comprehension are highly correlated 
(Silbert et al. 2014). 
However, other work suggests that production and comprehension draw on 
distinct representations, for example, of the discourse context. Yoon and Brown-Schmidt 
(2013) examined the use of discourse context by speakers and listeners during a natural 
conversation. We measured a phenomenon termed lexical differentiation, where speakers 
differentiate two sequentially presented objects from the same category (Van der Wege, 
2009). For example, if a speaker described one shirt in the context of several unrelated 
objects, she might refer to it as “the shirt”. However, if she later referred to a second, 
distinct shirt in the context of unrelated objects, she might differentiate the second shirt 
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from the first by using a modifier, as in “the striped shirt”, even though the modifier is 
not necessary in the local context. According to Van Der Wege (2009), speakers lexically 
differentiate in order to avoid giving the same label to two different entities, a process she 
terms “pre-emption by similar form” (also see Clark & Clark 1979). While speakers 
tended to differentiate, listeners did not appear to learn this tendency; there was no 
evidence that listeners expected speakers to differentiate the two objects. One 
interpretation of these findings is that listeners are more sensitive to the immediate local 
context, whereas speakers are more sensitive to the historical discourse context (Brennan 
& Clark, 1996). However, the speakers’ overall differentiation rate was not high (~7.5%), 
suggesting that in many cases neither interlocutor remembers the previous referent, thus 
reducing the lexical differentiation rate. 
Research in the memory tradition 
A well-known finding in the memory literature is that speaking, writing or 
otherwise producing items promotes better item memory compared to hearing or reading 
those items, a phenomenon known as the generation effect (Slamecka & Graf, 1978; also 
see MacLeod, et al., 2010). The meta-analytic effect size of the generation effect is large 
(d = .40; Bertsch, Pesta, Wiscott, & McDaniel, 2007), and observed in a variety of testing 
paradigms, including recognition, cued recall and free recall (Donaldson & Bass, 1980; 
Graf, 1980; Graf, 1982; Slamecka & Graf, 1978; Johnson et al., 1981). The effect obtains 
across a variety of different experimental paradigms, including various encoding rules 
(e.g., associate, rhyme, category, opposite, synonym), diverse materials (single word, 
word pair, sentences, and even pictures and arithmetic problems), different presentation 
rates (timed or self-paced), in both intentional and incidental learning paradigms, and in 
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both between and within subjects designs (Slamecka & Graf, 1978; McNamara & Healy, 
2000; deWinstanley & Bjork, 2004; McDaniel, Waddill, & Einstein, 1988).  
While it is clear that generation promotes item memory, less clear is how it affects 
memory for contextual information, including memory for one’s conversational partner. 
For example, Gopie and MacLeod (2009, Experiment 1), examined memory in a 
paradigm in which 60 different facts were paired with 60 different faces. In one condition 
participants saw a face and then read a sentence silently, imagining that the person in the 
photo told them the information (similar to playing the role of listener). In the other 
condition, participants read a sentence silently and then saw a face, and then said aloud 
the sentence to that face (similar to playing the role of speaker). Whereas memory for 
items (the sentences) was equivalent across these two conditions, memory for contexts 
(the faces) and for the pairing of item and context (face-fact pairings) was significantly 
better when participants received information than when they told that information to 
someone else (also see Jurica & Shimamura, 1999). One explanation is that when 
producing information, a speaker puts more focus on the to-be-communicated 
information, whereas when receiving information attention is more likely to spread to the 
context (see Koriat et al., 1991). Note, however, that in other paradigms in which context 
is operationalized in different ways (e.g., the color a word is presented in), generation 
does sometimes improve context memory (Marsh, Edelman, & Bower, 2001; Marsh & 
Hicks, 2002).  
 How might these findings extend to true conversational settings? In free-recall of 
unscripted conversation, participants tend to report more of what was heard than what 
was said (Stafford et al., 1987; Stafford & Daly, 1984; cf. Ross & Sicoly, 1979), though 
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this may be due to an egocentric bias to recall what seemed new to you (what someone 
said to you). Indeed, in an analysis of what information tends to get repeated over the 
course of a conversation, Knutsen and Le Bigot (2014) report that referring expressions 
like “the market” are more likely to be repeated in a conversation by the person who first 
introduced that topic into the conversation, consistent with a generation effect. McKinley, 
Brown-Schmidt, and Benjamin (2015) similarly report a generation benefit for item 
recognition in a natural conversation paradigm where the “items” were pictures that 
participants discussed with one of two conversational partners. This generation benefit 
for item recognition suggests that the tendency to report previously heard information in 
free-recall (Stafford et al., 1987; Stafford & Daly, 1984) may reflect a response bias. 
Further, inconsistent with the findings by Gopie and MacLeod (2009), McKinley et al. 
(2015) found no difference in context recognition between speakers and listeners, where 
context was defined as the partner with whom a picture was studied (though better item 
memory did boost performance overall for speakers). Taken together, these findings 
suggest that during the course of a natural conversation, speakers and listeners may arrive 
at different memory representations of the discourse history. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! 16!
CHAPTER 2: MULTIPARTY CONVERSATION 
In Experiments 1-4, I address a set of questions regarding the processes by which 
speakers design utterances in multiparty conversation. Across four experiments, I 
manipulate the identity of addressee or addressees and their knowledge states, and 
examine how speakers design utterances with respect to the intended addressees’ 
combined knowledge states. The first line of inquiry concerns the issue of whether 
speakers can maintain and flexibly use distinct representations of common ground shared 
with different individuals. To answer this question, in Experiment 1, speakers alternate 
between addressing a knowledgeable and a naïve partner, and I evaluate whether the form 
of the speaker’s expressions reflect the current addressee’s knowledge state. A positive 
answer to that question sets the stage for the second line of inquiry, which examines the 
way in which speakers design utterances in multiparty conversation. In Experiment 2, I 
test three potential hypotheses regarding how speakers produce referential expressions in 
three-party conversation. In Experiments 3 and 4, I create more taxing situations to 
examine whether speakers always pursue the same audience design strategy, or whether 
they develop different strategies depending on the situation. In Experiment 3, I create 
different combinations of knowledge states among the addressees in 4- and 5-party 
conversations in order to examine how the audience design processes scales up to even 
larger groups. In Experiment 4, I manipulate the local visual context in order to examine 
how speakers take into account both the immediate context and the addressees’ 
background knowledge at the same time. The results of Experiments 1-4 will contribute 
to our understanding of the mechanisms of audience design in multiparty conversation. 
 
! 17!
Experiment 1 
 Experiment 1 examined how Directors design referring expressions in a 
conversation with two Matchers who hold different degrees of common ground for a set 
of abstract image labels. To establish common ground for the labels, in a series of 
Entrainment trials, the Director completed a referential communication task with one 
Matcher once, and the other Matcher four times. To test for distinct representations of 
common ground, all three partners then completed a series of test trials together where 
the Director uniquely identified the images for one Matcher at a time.  
Method 
Participants 
Sixty undergraduates at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
participated in the experiment in return for either partial course credit or cash payment 
($12). Three participants took part in the study at the same time and were randomly 
assigned to the roles of Director, Matcher 1, and Matcher 2. All participants were native 
speakers of North American English, and had no reported hearing or uncorrected visual 
impairment.  
Materials and Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in two phases: Entrainment and Test. During the 
entrainment phase, pairs of participants (Director with the first Matcher; then the Director 
with the second Matcher) played a sorting game either 4 times (high-CG condition) or 1 
time (low-CG condition), entraining names for game-pieces in dyads. Following 
entrainment, all three participants sat in the same room to complete the test trials. The 
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two phases of the experiment, entrainment and testing, were completed four times with 
four separate sets of stimuli. 
 
Figure 2.1. Example stimuli during the first (Entrainment) phase of the task in 
Experiments 1, 2, and 3. The four different sets of figures were used once each across the 
four rounds of play. 
 
 In the first (entrainment) phase of the task, the Director and one of Matchers 
played a version of a referential communication task (Krauss & Weinheimer, 1966; 
Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992) while sitting at separate computers in the same room. Each 
partner viewed a computer screen with 16 abstract images, arranged in a different order 
on each screen (Figure 2.1). Across the entire experiment, there were a total of four sets 
of 16 images (64 total), which were adapted from previous experiments (Arnold, Hudson 
Kam, & Tanenhaus, 2007; Brown-Schmidt, 2009a), and similar pictures. 
During each entrainment trial, the 16 images were in set locations on the 
Director’s screen, whereas the Matcher was able to use the mouse to move the images. 
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The Director’s task was to instruct the Matcher on how to sort the images into the same 
order as the Director’s images. Typically, the dialogue involved the Director describing 
the 16 images, one at a time, to the Matcher, who re-arranged them into a new order. The 
Director and Matcher repeated the same task either 4 times (high-CG condition) or 1 time 
(low-CG condition) to establish either a high or a low degree of common ground for 
descriptions of these images. Both voices were recorded directly to disk. Participants 
were allowed to freely describe the images and there was no restriction on what they 
could say to complete the task. The task was interactive and participants were encouraged 
to ask questions as needed. While the two participants played the sorting game, the other 
participant performed a series of unrelated filler tasks (e.g., verbal and math tasks) in a 
separate room behind a closed door. These filler tasks were not scored; they were simply 
used to keep the third person occupied while the other two participants completed the 
sorting task. When the Director and the first Matcher were done sorting, two Matchers 
switched places, and the Director proceeded to sort the same 16 pictures with the second 
Matcher either 1 time (low-CG condition) or 4 times (high-CG condition).  
 
Figure 2.2. Example test display for Director (left) and addressee-Matcher (right) in 
Experiment 1. The Matcher who was not the addressee saw the same image as the 
addressee-Matcher, except his or her screen had a red square. Test displays always 
consisted of one new image (e.g., the bottom left one) and three old images.  
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 In the second phase of the task, all three participants completed the test session 
together in the same room (Figure 2.2). Each participant sat at a separate computer that 
showed three of the images that had previously been discussed during the entrainment 
phase, and one new image that had never been seen before by any of the three 
participants. The participants completed 28 test trials, including 16 target trials and 12 
filler trials. Target trials referred to the old images, whereas filler trials referred to the 
new images. Across the four different sets, stimuli on test trials included these 64 critical 
images as well as 112 additional images that served as novel fillers. 
On the Matchers’ screens, each test trial began with a fixation cross for 1000ms, 
then the cross disappeared and 4 images appeared (Figure 2.3). The Director’s screen 
showed the same four images in a different arrangement, one of which (the target) was 
indicated to the Director with a black box. At the center of the Director’s screen was a 
sentence that instructed the Director on whom they would be directing on that trial (either 
Matcher 1 or Matcher 2, e.g., “Give an instruction to Matcher 1”). The Director was 
prompted to tell either Matcher 1 or Matcher 2 (randomly alternating) to click on one of 
the 4 images. At the center of the Matchers’ screens, there was a square that indicated 
whether he or she was the current addressee or not. If the square was green, he or she was 
the current addressee, and was to follow the Director’s instructions to click the target. If 
the square was red, he or she was not the current addressee, and was instead asked to 
press enter after the other Matcher clicked the target. The order of trials was randomized, 
but overall Matcher 1 and Matcher 2 were each the intended addressee half of the time. 
The Director was allowed to describe the target in any way they saw fit, with the 
exception of locative phrases, such as “the top left one”; Matchers were free to converse 
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as they saw fit. The trial ended when the intended addressee clicked the target and the 
other Matcher hit enter to advance (Figure 2.3). The location of the 4 images on the 
Matchers’ and Director’s screen was random. 
 Matcher 2’ eye movements were monitored during the test session with an 
Eyelink 1000 desktop mounted eye tracker, however these data are not the focus of the 
present investigation so we do not discuss them further2.  
 
Figure 2.3. Experiment 1: Example procedure and hypothesized utterances at test. 
Matcher 1 is in the non-recent/ high CG condition; Matcher 2 is in the recent/ low CG 
condition. 
 
 The two phases of the experiment (Phase 1: sorting; Phase 2: testing) were 
repeated four times for each triplet of participants (Round 1: Phase 1-sort, Phase 2-test; 
Round 2: Phase1-sort, Phase 2-test, … Round 4: Phase 1- sort, Phase 2- test). Four 
different sets of images were used for the four different rounds of play. The order of the 
stimulus sets across blocks was counterbalanced across groups of participants. The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2!Eye movements were originally recorded in order to examine a supplemental question-- whether 
listeners could adjust their processing of the Director’s expression based on the perspective of the 
other Matcher in cases where the eye-tracked Matcher was not the addressee. However, the 
pattern of eye movements when the eye-tracked Matcher was not the addressee indicated that in 
such circumstances they were largely not paying attention to the instructions. As a result, we do 
not focus on the eye-gaze data in the present analyses.!
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Director, Matcher 1, and Matcher 2 maintained the same roles throughout the experiment 
(e.g., Matcher 1 never became Matcher 2, etc.). The entire experiment took 
approximately 90 minutes.  
 Across the four rounds of game play, we counterbalanced whether Matcher 1 or 
Matcher 2 held a high degree of common ground (high and low CG) with the Director, 
and whether Matcher 1 or Matcher 2 completed the entrainment trials first. I refer to the 
condition in which the Director and the first Matcher established a high degree of 
common ground and the second Matcher a low degree of common ground as the “High 
CG/ Low CG” condition. The condition in which the first Matcher had a low degree of 
common ground, and the second a high degree of common ground was labeled the “Low 
CG/ High CG” condition. The data analysis focused on the length of the Director’s 
referential descriptions as a function of the degree of common ground held between the 
Director and the current Matcher.  
I also included the recency of the experience that established common ground 
(recent and non-recent) as a control variable in the statistical analysis. This control 
variable was necessary because entrainment trials with Matcher 1 and Matcher 2 were 
completed in sequence, and was possible that very recently established common ground 
would be less sensitive to the degree of common ground manipulation. At test, when the 
Director spoke to the Matcher that went second during the entrainment phase, common 
ground was coded as “recent”, and “non-recent” when the addressee at test had gone first 
in the entrainment phase.  
Predictions 
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 Previous research has established that in referential communication tasks like the 
one examined here, partners develop brief, lexically-entrained terms as they repeatedly 
describe the same images (Schober & Clark, 1989; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Isaacs 
& Clark, 1987; Krauss & Weinheimer, 1964, 1966; Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992; Van 
der Wege, 2009). Moreover, these terms are partner-specific such that when speaking 
with a new, naive partner who is not familiar with the way the images had been described, 
speakers use longer, more elaborated expressions (Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992; Holler & 
Wilkin, 2009). Based on these findings, during the entrainment trials, I expected 
Directors to use shorter expressions over successive entrainment trials with the same 
Matcher, but longer expressions when switching to the second, naive Matcher. Such a 
finding would set the stage for our investigation of the flexibility of the use of common 
ground representations in test trials.   
 During test trials, if Directors can simultaneously maintain and flexibly alternate 
between distinct representations of the knowledge states of the two co-present Matchers, 
they should use short expressions when addressing the Matcher who has higher common 
ground. By contrast, Directors should be more likely to use longer expressions and 
produce more disfluencies when addressing the addressee with less knowledge. However, 
if Directors are unable to maintain distinct representations, or unable to flexibly switch 
back and forth between these representations, Directors may produce similar expressions 
for both Matchers, regardless of the degree of common ground they share.  
Results 
The referential descriptions produced by the Directors during both the 
entrainment and test trials were transcribed. The primary analyses focus on the length of 
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the Director’s referential expressions during entrainment and test. Following Yoon & 
Brown-Schmidt (2014), I coded whether the referential expression at test was fluent as a 
supplemental measure, based on the assumption that disfluency reflects speakers’ 
planning difficulty (Clark & Wasow, 1998; Ferreira, 1991). I analyzed the data using 
mixed-effects models; full model details are presented in Appendix A.  
Entrainment Trials 
The length of referring expressions during entrainment trials was calculated in 
terms of the number of all words used to describe the image. Word counts included all 
function (e.g., “the”) and content words (e.g., “circle”) in the referring expression, but not 
disfluencies, such as (“uh” and “um”). The average number of words used to describe 
each object for each trial is presented in Table 1. Across repeated trials with the same 
partner and stimuli, the length of each referring expression decreased gradually (Figure 
2.4), consistent with the formation of common ground. However, when switching to the 
second Matcher, Directors used longer expressions, demonstrating sensitivity to the new 
partner’s lack of knowledge. A typical transcript is illustrated below: 
Example transcript for the description of one of the 16 objects across rounds in 
the High CG/ Low CG condition: 
 1st: This is a weird thing with a triangle hole on the left and like a rectangular    
       hole on the right. Like pointy at the end… looks like a swan 3D chair maybe? 
 2nd: It is that weird, swan-shaped thing with the triangle and other thing. Saddle?  
        3D chair? 
 3rd: the weird swan 3D chair shape. 
 4th: the swan 3D chair. 
 (Partner switches from Matcher 1 to Matcher 2) 
 5th: It looks like a chair…. Has a triangle cut out of the bottom of it. It’s three     
       dimensions, has a pointed end at the top, looks like a swan 3D chair. 
 
 The analysis of expression length during entrainment included condition 
(High/Low CG and Low/High CG) and trial order (1-5) as fixed effects. A significant 
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effect of trial order was due to a gradual decrease in the number of words used to 
describe each item across trials (z=-13.004, p<.05). An interaction between trial order and 
condition (z= 7.135, p<.05) was explored in planned comparisons between the conditions 
at each trial separately (Table 2.1)3. These comparisons revealed a significant effect of  
condition starting at trial 2 such that Directors produced significantly longer expressions 
when they switched to the second Matcher (the Low CG/ High CG condition) compared 
to when Directors continued to address the same partner (the High CG/ Low CG 
condition) (see Figure 2.4). This partner-switch effect persisted during trials 3 and 4 as 
well, with Directors producing significantly longer expressions in the Low CG/ High CG 
condition. Finally, at trial 5, in the High CG/ Low CG condition, the Director began 
addressing the naïve second Matcher. This switch is reflected in the Director’s use of 
significantly longer expressions in the High CG/ Low CG condition, compared to the 
Low CG/ High CG condition.  
 
Figure 2.4. Experiment 1: The average number of words used by the Director to describe 
each object during the entrainment phase. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3!A supplementary analysis tested whether the Director’s egocentric knowledge of the labels 
influenced referring by comparing conditions where addressee naiveté was held constant, but 
Director knowledge changed. A comparison of expression length between the 1st and 5th 
entrainment trials in High CG/Low CG condition was not significant (t=-0.532, p>.05). Likewise, 
expression length between the 1st and 2nd trials in Low CG/High CG condition did not differ (t=-
1.521, p>.05). Thus, Directors designed expressions with respect to addressee knowledge; there 
was no evidence of an egocentric knowledge influences on utterance length (cf., Gann & Barr, 
2012).  
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Table 2.1. Experiment 1: The average number of words (and standard deviation) used to 
describe each image during the entrainment phase of Experiment 1 and the results of 
significance tests, comparing two conditions for each trial separately. The * indicates 
trials where the partner switched. 
Trial 
High/Low 
condition 
Low/High 
condition 
Significance test 
(t-value) 
p-value 
1 13.67 (9.98) 13.73 (10.93) -0.57 0.69 
2 7.13 (5.57) 13.00* (9.82) -8.56 <.001 
3 5.46 (3.87) 6.84 (4.99) -3.63 <.001 
4 4.82 (3.50) 5.60 (4.05) -3.43 <.001 
5 13.22* (11.48) 5.31 (4.13) 7.34 <.001 
 
Test Trials – Expression Length  
 Our primary analysis focused on the Director’s referential descriptions to evaluate 
whether descriptions were tailored to the common ground shared with the current 
addressee (Figure 2.5). When common ground had been established recently, Directors 
used short referring expressions, and the length did not differ depending on the amount of 
shared knowledge. By contrast, when common ground had not been established recently, 
Directors produced shorter expressions for high-CG partners than low-CG partners.   
  
Figure 2.5. Experiment 1: The average number of words per item on test trials. Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean by participants. 
 
 The statistical analysis revealed a significant interaction between the degree of 
common ground and recency (z=3.13, p<.05). Planned comparisons revealed that in the 
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non-recent conditions, referring expressions were significantly longer when Directors 
addressed low-CG partners compared to high-CG partners (z=-2.059, p<.05). By  
contrast, there was no effect of partner knowledge when common ground had been 
established recently (z=-0.017, p>.05)4.  
Test Trials – Disfluency  
As a supplemental measure, I analyzed the frequency with which speakers 
produced a disfluency when describing target objects during the test trials (Table 2.2). If 
Directors have difficulty designing expressions for the low common ground Matcher, 
disfluency should be more likely. Expressions were coded as disfluent if they contained 
an utterance-initial disfluency (e.g., um/uh… Click on the…”), lengthening of the definite 
article (e.g., “Click on thee…”), or if the expressions included additional descriptive 
phrases (e.g., “Click on the one… that looks like…”). While the rate of disfluency was 
highest in Non-recent/Low CG condition (38.28%), disfluency rates were low overall. 
Consistent with a floor effect, the statistical analysis revealed no significant effects of 
condition (ps>.05). 
In my earlier work, speakers produced disfluent expressions over 60% of the time 
when addressing a naïve matcher (Yoon & Brown-Schmidt, 2014); the uniformly low 
rate of disfluency in this study may be due to the fact that both the low-CG and the high-
CG partners had some experience with the image labels. 
Table 2.2. Experiment 1: Percentage of disfluent expressions on test trials.  
 Recent/ 
High CG 
Recent/ 
Low CG 
Non-recent/ 
High CG 
Non-recent/ 
Low CG 
Disfluency 32.14% 30.82% 36.96% 38.28% !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!4!At test, the speaker randomly alternated addressing the low- and high-CG partners. Whether the 
speakers addressed the same addressee from trial to trial or switched had no effect on expression 
length, and there was no interaction with condition (ts<1.0).!
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Summary and Discussion 
 In Experiment 1, I examined how interlocutors represent and use common ground 
in multiparty conversation. I demonstrated that speakers maintain distinct representations 
of common ground for two different co-present addressees. Despite demonstrations of 
switching costs in other aspects of perspective-taking (Ryskin, et al., 2014), speakers 
were able to switch between representations of common ground to accommodate the 
current addressee. Of note is the fact that the low-CG addressee did, in fact, have some 
experience with the referential labels. By contrast, most previous work examining the 
ability to adapt referring expressions to new partners has examined situations with 
completely naïve addressees (Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992; Horton & Spieler, 2007). The 
fact that speakers distinguished between addressees with 1 vs. 4 trials of experience is 
consistent with previous findings that interlocutors gradually build common ground 
(Brennan & Clark, 1996), such that the degree to which a given referent is considered 
common ground varies in a gradient fashion (Brown-Schmidt, 2012).  
I also found that when common ground had been established immediately prior to 
test, that speakers used uniformly short expressions, regardless of the degree of common 
ground. This effect of recency may be closely tied to the lack of an intervening 
experience with the other addressee in the recent condition, rather than the minimal time-
delay between establishment of entrained terms and their use in this condition: Even 
individuals with dense amnesia are able to recall lexically-entrained terms at accuracy of 
80% six months following entrainment (Duff, Hengst, Tranel, & Cohen, 2006). Similarly, 
in work on perceptual learning, a short (25min) delay between training and test did not 
diminish learning of a novel pronunciation (Kraljic & Samuel, 2005).  
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Of note is the fact that the low-CG addressee did, in fact, have some experience 
with the referential labels. By contrast, most previous work examining the ability to adapt 
referring expressions to new partners has examined situations with completely naïve 
addressees (Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992; Horton & Spieler, 2007). The fact that speakers 
distinguished between the low-CG and the high-CG Matcher in the non-recent conditions 
is consistent with the view that the degree to which a given referent is considered 
common ground varies in a gradient fashion (Brown-Schmidt, 2012). By contrast, this 
effect cannot be easily accounted for by a model in which common ground is encoded in 
a one-bit fashion, as in, my partner has vs. has not discussed this image with me (Galati 
& Brennan, 2010). Both the low-CG and the high-CG matcher had experience with the 
labels, so a one-bit partner model would not support the design of longer expressions for 
the low-CG Matcher. 
These findings allow for two important conclusions regarding the process of 
audience design. The first is that speakers seem to have some degree of control over the 
representations of common ground that they use when designing referring expressions. 
Even if the common ground shared with the non-addressee was automatically activated 
(i.e., Horton, 2007), utterance form was governed by the common ground held with the 
person the speaker intended to address. Second, this process of accessing the right 
representation of common ground for the intended addressee is remarkably fast and 
flexible. The fact that speakers were successful despite frequent partner switches 
emphasizes the importance of the relevant memory mechanisms in play (see discussion in 
Horton & Gerrig, 2005). Repeatedly accessing the representations of common ground for 
each of the two Matchers may have facilitated this process (Mayr, 2006). 
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Experiment 2 
The results of Experiment 1 show that speakers are able to maintain distinct 
representations of the perspective of each of two conversational partners. Thus, speakers 
readily adjust referring expressions to be appropriate for a less knowledgeable addressee 
(Figure 1.2, bottom left), or a more knowledgeable addressee (Figure 1.2, bottom right).  
Building on this finding, in Experiment 2, I address the question of how speakers design 
utterances when simultaneously addressing two individuals. Using a method similar to 
Experiment 1, the Director and one Matcher completed a referential communication task, 
establishing labels for abstract images. At test, I then examined situations in which the 
Director must simultaneously address two addressees, only one of whom is familiar with 
the entrained object labels. How do speakers approach the problem of audience design in 
situations like this, where the knowledge shared with the addressees is heterogeneous?  
Method 
Participants 
Sixty undergraduates at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
participated in the experiment in return for either partial course credit or cash payment 
($12). Three participants took part in the study at the same time and were randomly 
assigned to the roles of Director, Matcher 1, and Matcher 2. Participants maintained the 
same roles throughout the experiment. All participants were native speakers of North 
American English with normal hearing and normal or corrected-to-normal vision. None 
had participated in Experiment 1. 
Materials and Procedure 
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After being assigned to their respective roles, the participants as a group were 
given an overview of the experiment and each of their tasks. Like Experiment 1, the 
experiment was conducted in two phases. During the first phase, the Director established 
terms with Matcher 1 across 5 repeated trials. The procedure and materials were identical 
to the entrainment phase of Experiment 1, with the exception that Matcher 2 never 
participated in the sorting task. This change was instituted in order to simplify the 
experimental design. (For consistency, I will continue to refer to Matcher 2 as the “low-
CG” matcher despite the fact that this partner did not have knowledge of the object labels 
going into the test phase) 
In the second phase of the task, the participants completed 40 test trials, including 
32 target and 8 filler trials. On each of the 32 target trials, the Director referred to one of 
the old images that had previously been described in Phase 1. Each old image was 
referred to twice during the test trials, such that 16 of the target trials were first 
descriptions, and 16 were second descriptions. Old images were referenced twice in order 
to examine whether individual participants would describe the same image with more 
words when speaking to the low-CG matcher than the high-CG matcher. In addition, on 8 
filler trials, the Director referred to the new image (new images were only referenced 
once).  
The test display was identical to the test phase of Experiment 1 (Figure 2.3). 
Unlike Experiment 1, I did not track eye-gaze. The primary manipulation was the identity 
of the addressee(s) during test trials. Four different addressee conditions were 
manipulated in a blocked, within-subjects design (Figure 2.7): High CG (Matcher 1 only), 
Low CG (Matcher 2 only), High+Low CG (Matcher 1 and 2 together), and High/Low CG 
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Switching (Matcher 1 and 2 alternating). In all conditions, following entrainment, 
Matcher 1 left the room, and then the Matcher(s) for the test trials entered the room.  
In the High CG and Low CG conditions, the Director gave instructions to one 
partner, either the knowledgeable Matcher 1 or the naive Matcher 2, while the other 
Matcher performed unrelated tasks (e.g., verbal and math tasks) in a separate room.  
In the High+Low CG conditions, both Matcher 1 and Matcher 2 were present in 
the room during test trials, and the Director gave instructions that both Matcher 1 and 
Matcher 2 followed at the same time. The experimental instructions made it clear to all 
participants that Matcher 1 and 2 were to both follow the Director’s instructions.  
Lastly, in High/Low CG Switching condition, as in Experiment 1, both Matcher 1 
and Matcher 2 were present during test, and the Director was prompted to tell either 
Matcher 1 or 2 (randomly alternating) to click on one of the 4 objects.  
  
Figure 2.6. Experiment 2: Illustration of the four different addressee conditions that were 
manipulated in a blocked, within-subjects design during test trials. 
 
 Like Experiment 1, the two phases of the experiment (Phase-1: sorting; Phase-2: 
testing) were repeated four times for each triplet of participants with different materials. 
The order of the rounds was counterbalanced across groups of participants. The four 
rounds of play were otherwise identical with Director and Matcher 1 completing the 
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image sorting task 5 times, followed by test trials with four different conditions. The 
entire experiment lasted approximately 90 minutes.  
Data Analysis 
As in Experiment 1, I first analyzed the change in the length of referring 
expressions during entrainment to verify that partners converged on brief labels for each 
image. Our primary analysis examined the length of the referring expressions at test. The 
disfluency rate on test trials was used as a measure of planning difficulty. Finally, I 
examined the frequency with which Directors reconceptualized their descriptions of the 
referents at test (Horton & Gerrig, 2002), as a secondary measure of audience design. 
When describing a referent for a naive addressee (Horton & Gerrig, 2002; Yoon & 
Brown-Schmidt, 2014), speakers tend to change previously established referential 
descriptions by adding new or different content words. Such reconceptualizations may 
help addressees identify the intended referent in situations where an expression 
previously established with a different partner would be opaque to the new partner5. 
Predictions 
I evaluated three candidate hypotheses regarding the way in which speakers may 
approach audience design in multiparty settings. The predictions are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: AIM LOW. Speakers design utterances for the person with the least 
common ground at the expense of efficient communication with knowledgeable 
addressees. Directors should use longer expressions when describing test images in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Note Experiment 1 did not include a reconceptualization analysis because partial common 
ground was established with both high-CG and low-CG matchers at entrainment. Thus higher 
reconceptualization rates with the low-CG matcher would not unambiguously point to a re-design 
for the low-CG matcher; instead it might reflect distinct entrainment with the two matchers.  
! 34!
Low CG and High+Low CG conditions, compared to High CG condition, with no 
difference between the Low CG and High+Low CG conditions.  
Hypothesis 2: Combine. Speakers may estimate access representations of each 
addressee’s knowledge, and combine them in some way. One possibility that we consider 
is that the speaker calculates the average knowledge state of all addressees and designs 
expressions with respect to the average. Directors should use longer expressions in Low 
CG condition than the High CG condition, with expression length in the High+Low CG 
condition in-between. 
Hypothesis 3: AIM HIGH. Speakers may design expressions for the person with 
the most common ground, at the expense of naïve addressees. Expression length should 
not differ in the High CG condition and the High+Low condition; both conditions should 
produce shorter expressions as compared to the Low CG condition.  
Finally, the comparison between referring expressions in the high-switching and 
the low-switching conditions will allow us to replicate the finding of Experiment 1 that 
speakers readily alternate between distinct common ground representations. Additional 
comparisons between the switching conditions with the single-addressee conditions 
(High CG and Low CG) will indicate whether the presence of the non-addressee in the 
switching conditions affected the audience design process.  
In earlier research (Yoon & Brown-Schmidt, 2014), speakers used longer 
expressions when addressing the knowledgeable and naïve partners simultaneously 
compared to when speakers addressed the knowledgeable partner alone. While these 
findings, like the results of Experiment 1, show that speakers are sensitive to the needs of 
a relatively naïve partner, the design of that experiment did not allow us to distinguish 
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between the Aim low and Combining hypotheses, as both predict longer references when 
one of the addressees is naive. The present research adds a critical new comparison 
condition – one in which the Director addresses the naïve partner alone—that allows us to 
tease apart these two hypotheses. Finally, while Yoon and Brown-Schmidt’s (2014) 
findings are inconsistent with Aim high, Experiment 2 provides an opportunity to 
replicate this finding.  
Another outstanding issue is whether in Experiment 1 (and in Yoon & Brown-
Schmidt, 2014), the presence of the non-addressee affected the audience design process. 
While the results of Experiment 1 show that utterance design was guided by the 
knowledge state of the intended addressee, it is possible that the non-addressee 
influenced the production process nonetheless. One reason that the non-addressee could 
have affected referring is the idea that people serve as memory cues that result in 
automatic activation of information that is associated with them (Horton, 2007). If so, the 
presence of the more knowledgeable partner may have automatically activated the 
entrained terms, increasing the likelihood that the speaker would use an entrained term 
that the naïve addressee was unfamiliar with. In Experiment 2, I address this issue 
directly by comparing audience design in situations where a non-addressee is vs. is not 
present in the testing room. 
In sum, the aim of Experiment 2 is to evaluate candidate hypotheses regarding the 
way in which speakers design referring expressions in multiparty conversation. Note that 
while each of the three hypothetical approaches to audience design that I outline here 
(Aim Low, Combining, and Aim High) could be accomplished in a strategic fashion, basic 
attentional and memory mechanisms could also give rise to these processes. The aim is to 
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evaluate which of these approaches best characterizes audience design in the present 
settings. 
Results 
 As in Experiment 1, data analysis was conducted using mixed-effects models. For 
full model details, see Appendix A.  
Entrainment Trials 
 Analysis of the Director’s referential expressions during entrainment showed a 
typical pattern of referential shortening across trials (z=12.40, p<.05), consistent with 
gradual establishment of common ground (Figure 2.). 
  
Figure 2.7. Experiment 2: The average number of words used during entrainment trials.  
 
Test Trials – Expression Length  
 Our primary analyses examine the length of the referring expressions used to 
describe target images at test (Figure 2.8). Note the High/Low CG Switching condition 
was separated into two conditions, depending on whether the Director was addressing 
Matcher 1 (high-switching) or Matcher 2 (low-switching). As in Experiment 1, the 
dependent measure was word count; fixed effects were condition and repetition (first vs. 
second mention of the image). Because the critical conditions were not intended to be 
orthogonal, the data were analyzed in two separate models (see details in Appendix A).  
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The first set of analyses was designed to examine how Directors approached the 
problem of audience design when simultaneously addressing both a knowledgeable and a 
naïve partner. To this end, I compared expression length in the High+Low CG condition, 
with length in both the High CG and the Low CG conditions. This analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of repetition (z=4.586, p<.05), such that Directors used shorter 
expressions when describing target objects a second time at test. Directors also used 
shorter expressions when addressing their partner in the High CG condition than the two 
conditions where Directors addressed the Low CG partner (Low CG condition and 
High+Low CG condition; z=6.751, p<.05). Expressions were of equivalent length in the 
Low-CG and the High+Low CG conditions (z=1.158, p>.05). These findings show that 
Directors used long expressions any time the naïve partner was an addressee. These main 
effects were qualified by a significant interaction between repetition and partner 
knowledge (z=6.072, p<.05). The interaction was due to a significant decrease in the 
number of words for the second description of each item in the Low CG and High+Low 
CG conditions (z=5.424, p<.05), but not in the High CG condition (z=0.60, p>.05). This 
is likely because Directors were already using the briefest possible description when 
addressing the High CG partner. These findings offer support for the Aim Low 
hypothesis: Directors formulated expressions for the most ignorant addressee. 
 The second set of analyses compared the high-switching to the low-switching 
conditions. Consistent with Experiment 1, Directors flexibly designed expressions given 
the knowledge of the current addressee, using shorter descriptions for the high-CG 
matcher than the low-CG matcher in High/Low switching condition (z=7.019, p<.05). 
Note that the repetition effect was not significant (z=1.717, p>.05), which is unsurprising 
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because when images were described for a second time, the Director was speaking to a 
different addressee. An outstanding question that was not addressed by Experiment 1 is 
whether the presence of the partner that the Director was not addressing affected 
audience design. To answer this question, I compared expression length for the first 
descriptions of targets in the high-Switching condition with the High CG condition, and 
the low-Switching condition with the Low CG condition. These analyses revealed that 
the non-addressee had no effect (high-Switching vs. High CG: z=1.124, p>.05; low-
Switching vs. Low CG: z=0.308, p>.05)6.  
 
Figure 2.8. Experiment 2: The average number of words used to describe each image on 
test trials. Error bars represent the standard error of the by-participant mean. In the 
switching conditions, the first and second descriptions correspond to two different 
addressee-Matchers; in the other three conditions the Matcher was the same across the 
first and second descriptions. 
 
Test Trials – Disfluency 
 Disfluency was analyzed as an indirect measure of planning difficulty (Table 2.3), 
and was coded in the same way as Experiment 1. The pattern of results was similar to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6!As in Experiment 1,!there was also no evidence that switching between addressees at test 
affected referring; whether the speaker addressed the same addressee from trial to trial or 
switched had no effect on expression length, and there was no interaction with condition (ts<1.0).!
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those for expression length. Directors were more likely to produce a disfluent description 
when speaking to a low-common ground Matcher (Low CG & High+Low CG) than to 
the knowledgeable Matcher (High CG), (z=6.810, p<.05). Consistent with an Aim Low 
approach to audience design, disfluency rates did not significantly differ between the 
High+Low CG and Low CG conditions (z=0.644, p>.05). As with the analysis of 
expression length, an interaction between partner knowledge and repetition (z=4.547, 
p<.05) was due to decreases in disfluency for repeated descriptions in the High+Low and 
Low-CG conditions, but no change across repetitions in the High-CG condition.  
 Analysis of the conditions in which Directors alternated addressing the high- and 
low-CG partners indicated that Directors were more likely to be disfluent when speaking 
to a low-CG Matcher than to a high-CG Matcher (z=8.585, p<.05), consistent with more 
effortful audience design when addressing the naïve Matcher. The presence of an 
overhearer did not affect disfluency rates (high-Switching vs. High CG: z=0.728, p>.05; 
low-Switching vs. Low CG: z=-0.657, p>.05).  
Table 2.3. Experiment 2: Percentage of disfluent expressions on test trials.  
 High CG High-
Switching 
Low-
Switching 
High+Low  
CG 
Low CG 
First description 22.61% 25.19% 80.70% 75.89% 74.92% 
Second description 21.60% 22.68% 74.54% 26.90% 31.25% 
 
Test Trials – Reconceptualizations  
The final set of analyses examined the rate with which Directors reconceptualized 
referring expressions at test as a supplemental measure of audience design (Table 2.4). 
To identify reconceptualizations, I compared the final expression that was established 
with the high-CG Matcher during entrainment, with the first expression used for the same 
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image during test. If the expression on test trials contained different content words 
compared to the entrained term, this was considered a reconceptualization.  
Directors were more likely to reconceptualize when they spoke to a naïve 
addressee (High+Low and Low-CG) than to the knowledgeable addressee alone (z=8.039, 
p<.05), demonstrating sensitivity to the naïve addressee’s needs. However, in contrast to 
the pattern of findings for expression length, Directors were 14% more likely to 
reconceptualize when addressing the Low CG partner alone, vs. when they addressed 
both the Low and the High CG partners (z=2.361, p<.05). This result reveals some 
sensitivity to the presence of the more knowledgeable addressee in two-addressee settings. 
Finally, the analysis of the switching conditions revealed that Directors reconceptualized 
more often when addressing the Low CG partner than the High CG partner (z=8.793, 
p<.05). The non-addressee overhearer did not affect referring (high-Switching vs. High 
CG conditions z=1.276, p>.05; low-Switching vs. Low CG z=-1.035, p>.05).  
Table 2.4. Experiment 2: Percentage of reconceptualized expressions on test trials.  
 High CG High-
Switching 
Low-
Switching 
High+Low  
CG 
Low CG 
First description 20% 25.62% 73.08% 59.06% 72.37% 
Second description 22.31% 21.39% 70.36% 49.68% 53.12% 
 
Summary and Discussion 
 Speakers produced longer and more disfluent expressions when simultaneously 
speaking with a naïve and a knowledgeable addressee in a three-party conversation vs. 
when they addressed a knowledgeable addressee alone. By contrast, expressions were 
equally long and disfluent when speakers addressed a naïve partner in two-party 
conversation, as when they addressed both a naïve and a knowledgeable partner in three-
party conversation. These findings show that speakers Aimed Low – they designed 
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expressions for the least knowledgeable party. One analysis, did however, offer a hint 
that speakers were sensitive to the more knowledgeable party in three-person 
conversations: Speakers were more likely to use an entrained term (and not 
reconceptualize) when addressing both the naive and knowledgeable matcher vs. the 
naive matcher alone. This result suggests that the act of addressing a partner with 
common ground for an entrained term may make that entrained term more accessible in 
memory. 
Finally, the analysis of flexibility replicates the main findings of Experiment 1: 
speakers maintain distinct representations of common ground for different individuals, 
and are able to flexibly alternate between these representations in an addressee-
appropriate manner. There was no evidence (on any measure) that the non-addressee 
influenced referring; when speakers were addressing the naive matcher, the mere 
presence of the knowledgeable partner did not increase the use of entrained terms. 
Experiment 3 
 In Experiment 2, speakers lengthened expressions when simultaneously 
addressing a naïve and a knowledgeable listener, compared to a knowledgeable listener 
alone. While these findings are consistent with Aiming Low, an open question is whether 
in other circumstances, speakers might adopt a different strategy and design utterances 
with respect to some combination of the addressees’ knowledge states. Specifically, we 
ask whether speakers might depart from Aim Low in larger groups where the majority of 
addressees were knowledgeable of the object labels. I examine this question in both 4-
party conversation (Experiment 3a) and 5-party conversation (Experiment 3b).  
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Experiment 3a 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred twelve undergraduates (twenty-eight groups) at the University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign participated in the experiment in return for either partial 
course credit or cash payment ($12). Four participants took part in the study at the same 
time and were randomly assigned to the roles of Director, Matcher 1, Matcher 2, and 
Matcher 3. All participants were native speakers of North American English, and had no 
reported hearing or uncorrected visual impairment. None had participated in Experiments 
1 and 2. 
Materials and Procedure  
 The procedure and materials of Experiment 3a was identical to Experiment 2 in 
that experiment was conducted in two phases, entrainment and test. The primary 
manipulation was the identity of the Matcher or Matchers and their knowledge during the 
test phase: one knowledgeable matcher (1K), one naïve matcher (1N), two 
knowledgeable and one naïve matchers (2K1N), and one knowledgeable and two naïve 
matchers (1K2N). 
 During the first phase, the Director and Matcher 1 established image labels as a 
dyad, while the other Matchers performed an unrelated task (e.g., solving math problems) 
in another room. Thus, Matcher 1 became knowledgeable about the image labels, while 
the other Matchers remained naïve. In the 2K1N condition, the Director subsequently 
repeated the same entrainment phase with Matcher 2. In all cases Matcher 3 remained 
ignorant of the labels (Figure 2.9).  
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  At test, in each of the four conditions, the Director instructed one addressee (the 
1K and 1N conditions) or all three addressees (the 2K1N and 1K2N conditions) to click 
on one of the four objects. In the 1K and 1N conditions, the other Matchers performed 
unrelated tasks (e.g., verbal and math tasks) in a separate room. Participants completed 
24 target trials, including 16 target and 8 filler trials. The test displays were identical to 
the displays used in the test phase of Experiment 2, including 3 old images from 
entrainment and 1 new image. On target trials, the Director referred to one of the old 
images, while on filler trials, he or she referred to the new image. Unlike in Experiment 2, 
old images were referred only once during the test phase.  
 As in Experiments 1-2, the conditions were manipulated in a blocked, within-
subjects design. Four different sorting-testing blocks rotated each participant group 
through the four conditions; the order of blocks was counterbalanced across groups.  
 
Figure 2.9. Experiment 3a: Example procedure and illustration of the four different 
addressee conditions that were manipulated in a blocked, within-subjects design during 
test trials. This is an example in the 2K1N condition. Note that in the 1K, 1K 2N, and 1N 
conditions, the dotted box A (the second round of entrainment with Matcher 2) was not 
performed. 
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Predictions 
 This experiment was designed to test two candidate hypotheses regarding how 
speakers design utterances in multiparty conversation where each individual in a group 
shares different amount of joint knowledge. 
 Hypothesis 1: AIM LOW. As in Experiment 2, Directors’ expressions should only 
be sensitive to the presence of a naïve addressee. They should use longer expressions 
whenever there is at least one naïve addressee in a group. If so, expression length should 
be shorter in the 1K condition, and longer in the 2K1N, 1K2N and 1N conditions. Further, 
the rate of disfluency should be lower in the 1K condition than in the 2K1N, 1K 2N and 
1N conditions. However, Aim Low predicts that expression length and disfluency rate 
should not differ between the 2K1N, 1K2N, and 1N conditions. 
 Hypothesis 2: COMBINE. Speakers may be sensitive to the presence of both 
knowledgeable and naïve partners. Thus speakers must accommodate two distinct needs 
in conversation: Knowledgeable partners need short, efficient expressions, whereas naïve 
partners need longer, more informative expressions. If speakers combine the distinct 
needs of knowledgeable and naïve partners, expressions should be lengthened as 
combined knowledge state decreases. Thus we should expect an increase in expression 
length and rate of disfluency across the 1K, 2K1N, 1K2N, and 1N conditions.  
Results  
As in Experiments 1-2, expression length in both entrainment and test trials and the rate 
of disfluency during test trials were analyzed as a function of condition. Data analysis 
was conducted using mixed-effects models (see Appendix A).  
Entrainment Trials 
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 Directors completed four trials of entrainment with Matcher 1 in the 1K, 1K2N, 
and 1N conditions. In the 2K2N condition, the Director then completed four more 
entrainment trials with Matcher 2. During entrainment, Directors produced shorter 
expressions across trials, consistent with the previous findings in Experiments 1 and 2 
(Figure 2.10).  
 The statistical analysis of the entrainment trials examined how Directors 
established common ground and whether the entrainment process with Matchers 1 and 2 
differed. If the Director’s egocentric knowledge of the object labels affects entrainment, 
we might expect Directors to produce shorter expressions when completing entrainment 
trials with Matcher 2. The dependent measure was expression length during entrainment 
trials and fixed effects included trial (1-4) and Matcher (Matcher 1 vs. 2). The model 
revealed a main effect of trial: the expression length decreased across trials (z=-13.64, 
p<.05). Neither the main effect of matcher (z=1.59, p>.05) nor the interaction between 
trials and matcher (z=0.39, p>.05) was significant. When the Directors addressed Matcher 
2, they had already described the same images four times with Matcher 1. Although the 
Director had previous experience describing the same images, we found no evidence that 
this egocentric knowledge influenced their referential expression (cf. Gann & Barr, 2012). 
Instead, Directors designed expressions based on their current partners’ knowledge state. 
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Figure 2.10. Experiment 3a: The average number of words used to describe each image 
across the four trials of entrainment. Note that Matcher 1 participated in entrainment 
trials across all four conditions, while Matcher 2 participated in entrainment trials in only 
the 2K1N condition. 
 
Test Trials – Expression Length  
 During test trials, Directors produced gradually longer expressions as the 
combined naiveté of the addressees increased (Figure 2.11). Expression length was 
shortest in the 1K condition and longest in the 1N condition. Expression lengths in the 
2K1N and 1K2N were in-between.  
 I analyzed the Directors’ referential expressions during test using a maximal 
mixed-effects model. Condition was included as a fixed effect and the dependent measure 
was the number of words that the Director used to describe each image. Expressions in 
the 1K condition were shorter than the other four conditions (z=10.261, p<.05), and 
expressions in the 2K1N condition were shorter than the 1K2N and 1N conditions 
(z=3.541, p<.05). There was no difference between the 1K2N and 1N conditions (z=0.984, 
p>.05). Overall, these findings are contrary to the prediction of the Aim Low hypothesis, 
Directors were sensitive to the combined knowledge states of the addressees and seemed 
to design their utterances with respect to the overall knowledge state. The fact that there 
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was no significant difference between the 1K2N and 1N conditions suggests that 
expression length did not linearly increase as combined knowledge states decreased. The 
lack of a significant difference between the 1K2N and 1N conditions may reflect a ceiling 
effect. Alternatively, it may suggest that speakers are not designing utterances based on 
mathematical average of addressees’ knowledge states, and instead weighing the needs of 
naïve addressees more heavily in determining how to design expressions. 
 
 
Figure 2.11. Experiment 3a: The average number of words used to describe each image 
on test trials. Error bars represent the standard error of the by-participant mean. 
 
Test Trials – Disfluency  
 As in Experiments 1 and 2, I analyzed the rate of disfluency as a measure of the 
Directors’ planning difficulty. Disfluency was coded in the same way as the previous 
experiments. Similar to the analysis of expression length, Directors were least disfluent in 
the 1K condition and most disfluent in the 1N condition (Table 2.5).  
 The analysis of disfluency rate included condition as a fixed effect; the dependent 
measure was binary, whether the Director was disfluent or not. This analysis revealed 
that Directors were less disfluent in the 1K condition than in the other three conditions 
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(z=9.17, p<.05), and also less disfluent in the 2K1N condition than in the 1K2N and 1N 
conditions (z=2.25, p<.05). The rate of disfluency did not differ between the 1K2N and 
1N conditions (z=1.48, p>.05).  
 The results indicated that as combined naiveté increased, speakers were gradually 
more disfluent. These findings are consistent with the Combine hypothesis—speakers 
designed utterances with respect to a combination of the knowledge of the intended 
addressees. The fact that the disfluency rate in the 1K2N is significantly higher than in 
the 2K1N condition (z=2.52, p<.05) supports the idea that speakers consider the 
composition of the group’s knowledge, rather than group size itself, when they design 
expressions. 
Table 2.5. Experiment 3a: Percentage of disfluent expressions on test trials.  
 1K 2K1N 1K2N 1N 
Disfluency 31.25% 56.15% 65.10% 70.85% 
 
Experiment 3b 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred sixty-five undergraduates (thirty-five groups) at the University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign participated in the experiment in return for either partial 
course credit or cash payment ($16). Five participants took part in the study at the same 
time and were randomly assigned to the roles of Director, Matcher 1, Matcher 2, Matcher 
3, and Matcher 4. All participants were native speakers of North American English, and 
had no reported hearing or uncorrected visual impairment. None had participated in 
Experiments 1, 2, or 3a. 
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Figure 2.12. Experiment 3b: Example procedure and illustration of the five different 
addressee conditions that were manipulated in a blocked, within-subjects design during 
test trials. This is an example in the 3K1N condition. Note that in the 1K, 1K3N, and 1N 
conditions, dotted box A (entrainment trials with Matcher 2 and 3) was not performed, 
and in the 2K2N condition, dotted box B (entrainment trials with Matcher 3) was not 
performed. 
 
 
Materials and Procedure 
 The procedure of Experiment 3b was identical to Experiment 3a, including two 
phases, entrainment and test (Figure 2.12). The key manipulation was the number of 
Matchers and their knowledge during the test phase: one knowledgeable matcher (1K), 
one naïve matcher (1N), three knowledgeable and one naïve matchers (3K1N), two 
knowledgeable and two naïve matchers (2K2N), and one knowledgeable and three naïve 
matchers (1K3N).  
 In the 2K2N and 3K1N conditions, the entrainment phases were repeated 
sequentially with two (2K2N) or three (3K1N) addressees. In the 2K2N condition, 
Matcher 1 and Matcher 2 sequentially performed entrainment phases, and then all 
Matchers participated in the test phase. In the 3K1N condition, Matcher 1, 2, and 3 
sequentially performed entrainment phases before the test phase. Following entrainment, 
at test, the Director described the target image for the Matcher or Matchers (depending on 
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the condition) so that the Matcher(s) could click the target on their screen(s). 5 different 
sets of images were used to rotate each group of participants through the 5 conditions 
across 5 blocks of trials. The 5 different addressee conditions were manipulated in a 
blocked, within subject design and the order of blocks was counterbalanced across groups.  
Predictions 
 As in Experiment 3a, I tested the same candidate hypotheses in 5-party 
conversation and the predictions were similar to those in Experiment 3a. If speakers 
always Aim Low (Hypothesis 1), I expected longer expressions in the 1K3N, 2K2N, 
1K3N, and 1N compared to the 1K condition, but no significant difference between the 
first four conditions. In contrast, if speakers Combine the goals of efficiency and 
informativity (Hypothesis 2), then expression length should vary according to the mixture 
of common ground among the addressees. On this view, I would predict a general 
increase in expression length and disfluency rate as the combined knowledge state of the 
addressees decreases. 
Results  
The same measures as in Experiment 3a, expression length in entrainment and test trials, 
and rates of disfluency were analyzed (For full models, see Appendix A).  
Entrainment Trials 
 
 Directors performed one round of entrainment with Matcher 1 in the 1K, 1K3N, 
and 1N condition, prior to test. Directors performed one round of entrainment with 
Matcher 1 and then one round with Matcher 2 in the 3K1N and 2K2N conditions. 
Directors completed three sequential rounds of entrainment (with Matchers 1, 2, and 3) in 
the 3K1N condition. Note that entrainment trials were always performed in a dialogue 
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between the Director and one of Matchers. Thus, in the conditions where multiple 
Matchers had knowledge of the object labels, these entrainment trials were completed in 
sequence.  
 Consistent with previous findings, Directors shortened their referential 
expressions as they repeated their descriptions of the same images across trials (Figure 
2.13). The pattern of referential shortening across trials was similar for Matchers 1, 2, and 
3, despite the fact that the Directors’ own egocentric knowledge accumulated across trials 
and rounds.  
 Our analysis of the entrainment trials evaluated whether the establishment of 
common ground with each particular Matcher across the four trials was influenced by 
Directors’ egocentric knowledge. If Directors shorten utterances across trials based on the 
addressee’s knowledge alone, we should see shorter expressions across trials, but no 
difference in expression length as a function of which Matcher the director is talking to. 
By contrast, if Directors are influenced by their egocentric familiarity with the object 
labels, then expressions should be significantly shorter with Matchers 2 and 3, compared 
to Matcher 1.    
In a mixed-effect model, Matcher and trials (1-4) were included as fixed effects 
and the dependent measure was the number of words that Directors used to describe each 
image. The model showed a significant main effect of trial (z=-19.42, p<.05) and an 
interaction between Matcher (Matcher 1 vs. Matcher 2 and 3) and trial (z=4.23, p<.05), 
but not a main effect of Matcher (z=-1.18, p>.05). The significant main effect of trial was 
due to a reduction in description length across the four trials, consistent with gradual 
establishment of common ground. The interaction was mainly driven by a marginal 
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difference between utterances designed for Matcher 1 vs. utterances designed for 
Matchers 2 or 3 on the fourth trial (z=1.82, p=0.07). On the fourth trial, Directors 
produced slightly shorter expressions for Matcher 1 than Matcher 2 and 3, but this 
difference was marginal. During trials 1-3, expression length did not differ as a function 
of the Matcher. These findings show that Directors design referential expressions based 
primarily on the current addressee’s needs, rather being influenced by their own 
egocentric knowledge.  
 
Figure 2.13. Experiment 3b: The average number of words used to describe each image 
across the four trials of entrainment. Note that the Director completed entrainment trials 
with Matcher 1 in all five conditions. Following entrainment with Matcher 1, in the 
3K1N and 2K2N conditions, the Director completed 4 more entrainment trials with 
Matcher 2. In the 3K1N condition only, the Director then completed 4 more entrainment 
trials with Matcher 3. 
 
Test Trials – Expression Length  
 During test trials, directors increased expression length as the combined naiveté of 
the Matchers increased (Figure 2.14). Directors produced the shortest expressions in the 
1K condition and the longest expressions in the 1N condition. The expression lengths in 
the other conditions were in-between (3K1N, 2K2N, and 1K3N).  
 Expression length was analyzed in the mixed-effects model, including condition 
as a fixed effect. Expressions in the 1K conditions were shorter than the other four 
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conditions (z=15.13, p<.05), and expressions in the 3K1N condition were shorter than 
expressions in the 2K2N, 1K3N, and N conditions (z=2.43, p<.05). There was no 
difference in expression length among the 2K2N, 1K3N, and N conditions (2K2N vs. 
1K3N and N: z=0.83, p>.05; 1K3N vs. N: z=1.65, p>.05).   
 
Figure 2.14. Experiment 3b: The average number of words used to describe each image 
on test trials. Error bars represent the standard error of the by-participant mean. 
 
Test Trials – Disfluency  
Disfluency was coded in the same way as in the previous experiments. The rate of 
disfluency increased as the combined knowledge states among addressees decreased 
(Table 2.6). Directors were least disfluent in the 1K condition and most disfluent in the 
1N condition. 
 The disfluency rate was analyzed in a mixed-effect model that included condition 
as a fixed effect; a binary measure of disfluency was used as the dependent measure. 
Directors were significantly less disfluent in the 1K conditions than in the other four 
conditions (z=5.61, p<.05). The disfluency rate was lower in 3K1N condition than in the 
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2K2N, 1K3N, and 1N conditions (z=2.280, p<.05). The disfluency rate in the 2K2N 
condition did not differ from the rate in the 1K3N and 1N conditions (z=1.66, p>.05), 
while the disfluency rate between the 1K3N and 1N conditions did significantly differ 
(z=2.39, p<.05). These findings are generally consistent with the Combining hypothesis-- 
that Directors balance the distinct needs of knowledgeable and naïve addressees when 
designing expressions. 
Table 2.6. Experiment 3b: Percentage of disfluent expressions on test trials.  
 1K 3K1N 2K2N 1K3N 1N 
Disfluency 25.13% 46.33% 50.18% 51.25% 60.93% 
 
Summary and Discussion of Experiments 3a-3b 
During the entrainment phases of Experiments 3a-3b, Directors gradually 
established common ground, shortening expressions across repeated trials. Even when 
they had already completed four rounds of entrainment with a different Matcher, 
Directors designed referential expressions based on the current addressee’s knowledge 
state. Directors produced long, descriptive utterances on the first round of entrainment, 
regardless of whether they were directing the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd Matcher. These utterances 
became shorter across successive trials of entrainment in a similar way for all three 
Matchers. Our findings are in contrast to results from earlier work by Gann and Barr 
(2012) that showed speakers designed shorter referential expressions for a naïve partner 
when the speaker had egocentric knowledge of the object labels compared to when they 
were naïve. In Gann and Barr (2012)’s study, they compared speakers’ descriptions of 
old and new referents for a naïve partner on test trials, while in Experiments 3a-3b, 
speakers’ descriptions on the first round of entrainment were compared with respect to 
the current partner (the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd Matcher). Across two studies of Experiments 3a and 
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3b, the primary determinant of utterance form was the addressee’s knowledge state, 
inconsistent with the idea that utterance design is guided by egocentric knowledge.  
During test trials, speakers considered the knowledge states of multiple 
addressees and flexibly designed expressions with respect to the mixtures of common 
ground among addressees. The results of Experiment 3a and b were most consistent with 
Combine hypothesis. As the combined knowledge states of the addressees decreased, 
expression length and the rate of disfluency numerically increased. In particular the 
transition from a single knowledgeable addressee (1K) to a group with one or more naïve 
addressees resulted in a large and significant increase in utterance length. We also 
observed in both studies a point at which the utterance length seemed to asymptote. 
One explanation is that speakers base audience design on the dominant 
knowledge state among the set of addressees: When naïve partners are dominant (e.g., 
1K2N and 1N in Experiment 3a; 1K3N and 1N in Experiment 3b), speakers may 
emphasize the needs of the naïve addressee(s) more than the needs of the knowledgeable 
addressee, and produce long, descriptive expressions. In contrast, when knowledgeable 
partners dominate the group, speakers consider both conversational efficiency and 
informativity when designing expressions.  
Directors were particularly sensitive to the presence of at least one naïve 
participant in a group, demonstrating a dramatic increase in expression length and 
disfluency rate from the 1K condition to the 2K1N or 3K1N conditions. This implies that 
when combining knowledge states, speakers take informativity for naïve addressees into 
consideration more than efficiency for knowledgeable addressees. Of course, the task 
goals may be relevant. In the task, all of the addressees were required to identify the 
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target for each trial; this task may have caused speakers to emphasize informativity more 
than efficiency. Thus, the way in which the speaker balances informativity and efficiency 
may reflect an optimization process in situations where addressees have different needs. 
The fact that speakers did design utterances differently depending on the composition of 
our participant groups shows that speakers do not always use an Aim Low strategy. 
Instead, they may flexibly modulate the approach to audience design depending on the 
mixtures of common ground among addressees. 
Experiment 4 
 Speakers design referring expressions with respect to the local context and adjust 
their referring expressions when the addressee’s immediate context differs from their 
own (Nadig & Sedivy, 2002). Less clear is how this contextual sensitivity scales up to 
multiparty conversation, where each interlocutor may have different background 
knowledge and a different immediate context. Experiment 3 showed that speakers are 
sensitive to the combined knowledge among addressees. However, less well understood 
is how speakers integrate different sources of information when designing utterances, 
such as immediate contextual information and the addressee’s background knowledge. 
Here I tested the same two hypotheses in Experiment 3, Aim low and Combine, but this 
time I manipulated the immediate visual context, rather than the addressees’ background 
knowledge. The overall knowledge state of the two addressees was the same as in the 
High+Low CG condition of Experiment 2 (one knowledgeable addressee and one naïve 
addressee). The question is the same as in Experiment 3 – whether audience design 
favors addressees who lack common ground, regardless of the complexity of the 
immediate context (Aim low) or whether speakers attempt to balance the different needs 
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of addressees with respect to both immediate contextual information and background 
knowledge (Combine). 
Method 
Participants 
Eighty-four undergraduates (twenty-eight groups) at the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign participated in the experiment in return for either partial course credit 
or cash payment ($12). Three participants took part in the study at the same time and 
were randomly assigned to the roles of Director, Matcher 1, and Matcher 2.  
 
Figure 2.15. Experiment 4: Experimental procedure.  
 
Materials and Procedure 
The procedure of Experiment 4 was similar to the procedure of Experiment 2, 
which examined triadic conversation. Again, the task consisted of two phases: 
entrainment and test trials. The Director and Matcher 1 first played a tangram-sorting task 
as a dyad. The tangrams were black and white abstract figures from Slocum (2004). They 
repeated the same task five times, establishing labels for 16 abstract tangram images, 
! 58!
while Matcher 2 was in another room. Thus, the Director and Matcher 1 shared common 
ground for the image labels, whereas Matcher 2 was naïve. Test trials as a triad followed 
the entrainment trials. At test, the Director simultaneously instructed Matcher 1 and 
Matcher 2 to click on one of the 4 images. Matcher 1 and Matcher 2 had separate 
computers that showed 4 images on each trial, and the Director had a screen that 
separately depicted the 4 images that each matcher had (8 total) (Figure 2.15). I 
manipulated the visual contexts that Matcher 1 and Matcher 2 encountered: Baseline: 
four old tangrams that the Director and Matcher 1 had previously labeled during 
entrainment. Simple: one old tangram and three new basic objects (e.g., ball). Complex: 
two old tangrams that the Director and Matcher 1 had previously labeled during 
entrainment, and two new tangrams that were similar to the old tangrams.  
At test, each Matcher viewed a scene in one of these three conditions (trial order 
was pseudo-randomized within each of 4 blocks); see Table 2.7 (also Figure 2.16) for 
details of the experimental design.  
In the Same-context condition (1), both Matcher 1 and 2 viewed same baseline 
context, including four old tangrams from entrainment. Critically, in this condition the 
Matchers view the same scene, but only Matcher 1 knows the names of the images (this 
is similar to the design of Experiment 2). 
In the Simple/baseline condition (2), Matcher 1 had the simple context and 
Matcher 2 had the baseline context. This condition is similar to the same-context 
condition in that Matcher 2 is presented with an array of four novel tangrams that they do 
not know the names of.  
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In the Baseline/simple condition (3), Matcher 2 had the simple context and 
Matcher 1 had the baseline context. In this condition, Matcher 2’s task is significantly 
easier because there is only 1 tangram in their array.  
Finally, in the Complex/simple condition (4), Matcher 1 had the complex context 
and Matcher 2 had the simple context.  
 There were 16 critical target trials and 8 filler trials in each of four experimental 
blocks. During filler trials, the two Matchers had the same simple context for half of trials 
and the same complex context for the other half of trials. The target on critical trials was 
always one of the old tangrams, while the target on filler trials was either one of the basic 
objects (e.g., the banana) or one of new tangrams that were similar to the old tangrams 
but that had not been seen during entrainment. The condition manipulation was within 
subjects, and each group of participants completed four different entrainment-testing 
blocks (a total of 64 target trials and 32 filler trials). Within each block the order of trials 
was pseudorandomized. The order of blocks was counterbalanced across groups of 
participants. Four lists were constructed to rotate the items through the four conditions 
(each participant only saw the items on a single list). 
Table 2.7. Critical manipulations of visual context during test trials.    
Condition (within-subjects) M1’s context M2’s context 
(1) Same-context Baseline  Baseline  
(2) M1-simple / M2-baseline Simple  Baseline  
(3) M1-baseline / M2-simple Baseline  Simple  
(4) M1-complex / M2-simple Complex  Simple  
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Figure 2. 16. Experiment 4: Critical manipulations of visual contexts that Matcher 1 and 
Matcher 2 encountered during test trials. The order of conditions was counterbalanced 
across groups. 
 
Predictions 
The results of Experiment 2 showed that speakers Aimed Low when they 
addressed one knowledgeable and one naïve addressee, both of whom had the same 
visual context. The primary manipulation of Experiment 4 was to vary the immediate 
contexts that two addressees encountered, while maintaining their overall knowledge 
state – one knowledgeable and one naïve addressee –across conditions. If speakers Aim 
Low as in Experiment 2, expression length should reflect Matcher 2’s naiveté and context. 
On the Aim Low view, speakers should produce longer expressions in the (1) Same-
context and (2) Simple/Baseline conditions than the (3) Baseline/Simple and (4) 
Complex/ Simple conditions, because it is in conditions (1) and (2) that the naïve 
Matcher 2 has the difficult task of distinguishing between four tangrams they have never 
seen before. By contrast, in conditions (3) and (4) the naïve addressee can easily identify 
the single tangram because it is the only one of its kind.  
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In contrast, if speakers Combine, speakers should show sensitivity to both 
Matcher 1 and Matcher 2’s perspective. On a Combine view (like Aim low predicts), 
Directors should produce longer expressions in conditions (1) and (2) than condition (3), 
due to Matcher 2’s lack of knowledge about old tangrams. In addition, the Combine view 
predicts that when Matcher 1 has a complex display (4), speakers should produce longer 
expressions to help Matcher 1’s understanding, compared to the condition (3) 
Baseline/Simple.  
Results  
As in the previous experiments, expression length in the entrainment and test trials, and 
the rates of disfluency during the test trials were analyzed (see Appendix A for full 
models). 
Entrainment Trials 
 During entrainment, the Directors produced shortened expressions across trials, 
consistent with previous findings that interlocutors gradually established common ground 
(z=-17.32, p<.05). 
 
Figure 2.17. Experiment 4: The average number of words used to describe each image 
across the five trials of entrainment.  
 
 
Test Trials – Expression Length  
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 Directors produced the shortest expressions in the (3) Baseline/Simple condition 
and the longest expressions in the (4) Complex/Simple condition (Figure 2.18). 
Expression length in the other two conditions, (1) Same-context and (2) Simple/Baseline, 
were in-between.  
 Expression length at test was analyzed with maximal mixed-effects models. 
Directors produced similar-length expressions in the (1) Same-context and (2) 
Simple/Baseline conditions (z=1.33, p>.05); the lack of a significant difference between 
these conditions suggests that Directors prioritized Matcher 2’s lack of common ground 
for the image labels. Expression length was significantly shorter in the (3) 
Baseline/Simple condition than in the (2) Simple/Baseline and (1) Same-context 
conditions (z=4.67, p<.05), indicating that Directors were sensitive to naïve Matcher 2’s 
needs. Directors produced the longest expressions in the (4) Complex/Simple condition, 
compared to the other three conditions (z=-8.44, p<.05), suggesting that they considered 
Matcher 1’s local context when designing expressions. Even though Matcher 1 was more 
knowledgeable than Matcher 2, Directors adjusted their referential expressions to support 
Matcher 1’s needs. Thus, the findings suggest that Directors were sensitive to both 
Matcher 1 and Matcher 2’s distinct perspectives and flexibly designed utterances 
accordingly.  
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Figure 2.18. Experiment 4: The average number of words used to describe each image on 
test trials. Error bars represent the standard error of the by-participant mean. 
 
Test Trials – Disfluency  
 Disfluency was coded in the same way as in the previous experiments. Overall, 
the rate of disfluency was high across the four conditions (Table 2.8). 
 I analyzed a binary measure of disfluency in a mixed-effect model, including 
condition as a fixed effect. Similar to the analysis of expression length, the disfluency 
rate was significantly higher in the (4) Complex/Simple condition compared to the other 
three conditions (z=-7.08, p<.05), and the disfluency rate was lower in the (3) 
Baseline/Simple than the (1) Same-context and (2) Simple/Baseline conditions (z=2.19, 
p<.05). The rate of disfluency in the (1) Same-context and (2) Simple/Baseline conditions 
did not significantly differ (z=0.31, p>.05).  
Table 2.8. Experiment 4: Percentage of disfluent expressions on test trials.  
 Same-
context 
M1-simple/ 
M2-baseline 
M1-baseline/ 
M2-simple 
M1-complex/ 
 M2-simple 
Disfluency 62.76% 62.62% 57.14% 83.80% 
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Summary and Discussion 
 
 In Experiment 4, Directors established common ground for a series of abstract 
image labels with one Matcher, and then subsequently engaged in a three-party 
conversation with this knowledgeable Matcher and a new, naïve matcher.  The analysis 
of utterance form during this three-party conversation revealed that Directors were 
sensitive to both the knowledgeable and the naïve partner’s needs based on their local 
contexts and each partner’s background knowledge. When the task was difficult for the 
naïve Matcher, Directors produced long expressions. When the task was difficult for the 
knowledgeable Matcher, due to the introduction of novel distractors, Directors also 
produced long expressions. By contrast, when the task was easy for both Matchers, 
Directors produced short, efficient expressions. 
Note that our manipulation of the local contexts was intermixed across test trials. 
Thus, to succeed, Directors had to promptly assess both partners’ contexts and knowledge 
states, and design an appropriate referring expressions. The fact that our Directors were 
successful at assessing both the scene and the knowledge state of the addressees shows 
that these processes are quite rapid. 
 The finding that Directors took the perspective of both the naïve and 
knowledgeable partners into consideration is contrary to the prediction of Aim Low 
hypothesis. While my previous work suggested that in 3-party conversation that speakers 
may adopt an Aim Low approach (Yoon & Brown-Schmidt, 2014; Experiment 1-3), the 
results of this study, along with the results of Experiments 3a-3b show that speakers take 
the needs of both naive and knowledgeable addressees into consideration. When a 
knowledgeable partner encountered a complex context (4), the Complex/simple condition, 
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Directors produced longer expressions despite the fact that the naïve partner had a very 
easy task (i.e., to identify a single tangram in a set of everyday objects). Taken together, 
the findings suggest that speakers represent the distinct perspectives of multiple 
addressees, and tailor expressions for all to understand with respect to each addressee’s 
immediate context and their background knowledge in multiparty conversation. 
General Discussion 
Representation of Perspective 
How do speakers represent common ground in multiparty conversation? If 
speakers cannot hold onto two distinct perspective representations at the same time, they 
should be unable to rapidly alternate between individual addressees in multiparty 
conversation. Similarly, if the representations of common ground associated with 
individual partners were to become blended and the distinct representations of the 
perspectives of these individuals lost (Figure 1.1), it would predict that speakers should 
have difficulty designing an utterance for one partner at a time, and that expressions 
designed for multiple addresses simultaneously should have similar properties to 
expressions designed for one of them. One reason to think speakers might fail to maintain 
distinct representations comes from findings that speakers experience difficulty 
distinguishing between different conversation partners when the partners share similar 
background knowledge (Horton & Gerrig, 2005). Further, egocentric biases in assessing 
others’ knowledge (Fussell & Krauss, 1991, 1992), may make it difficult for speakers to 
distinguish their own knowledge from that of the addressees. 
The results of Experiments 1-2 show that speakers can, in fact, actively maintain 
multiple representations of common ground held with different people. These 
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representations are distinct from each other, and from one’s own egocentric knowledge. 
Even in situations where the non-addressee was present at test, speakers designed longer 
expressions when addressing a low-knowledge partner, and shorter expressions when 
addressing a high-knowledge partner. Speakers did not discard the representations of the 
perspective of the individual addressees. 
What form do these perspective representations take? On one view, audience 
design can be supported by a simple, one-bit model of the partner’s knowledge, for 
example a representation that a label for an abstract image “is” or “is not” part of the 
discourse record (Galati & Brennan, 2010). This proposal is appealing because it 
provides a simple mechanism for encoding perspective that would presumably pose few 
resource demands. While a one-bit partner model may have explanatory power in other 
situations, it cannot account for the full pattern of findings here. Critically, in the non-
recent conditions of Experiment 1, speakers designed expressions differently for 
addressees who had different degrees of experience with the image labels. This finding 
cannot be explained by a one-bit model because these image labels were part of the 
discourse record for both addressees—critically, the addressees varied in their degree of 
experience with those labels. Instead, our findings are consistent with the proposal that 
conversational partners represent gradient information about the degree to which a given 
piece of information is common ground with a specific discourse partner (Brown-
Schmidt, 2012). The more firmly an object and its description were established as 
common ground, the shorter the expression. 
An open question is how exactly these representations are encoded in memory, 
and if, in fact, they are encoded directly. One possibility is that the memorial record 
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includes a separate representation of the common ground status of a given entity, e.g., a 
representation that encodes the fact that the term “the 3D chair” is common ground with 
a specific addressee, with these representations of common ground status per se guiding 
audience design. Alternatively, the common ground status of individual entities may not 
be stored per se, and instead, audience design might make use of memorial records of 
joint experience that are re-activated in the moment (see Horton & Gerrig, 2005). 
Regardless of whether they are represented per se or generated on-the-fly on the basis of 
memory access, our findings point to these representations as being partner-specific, 
gradient, and flexibly deployed in conversational settings. These representations 
(however they are encoded) likely draw on multiple memory systems including both 
declarative (e.g., episodic) and non-declarative (e.g., priming, procedural learning) 
memory mechanisms (Duff & Brown-Schmidt, 2012).  
Together with other findings from the literature, the emerging picture, then, is that 
conversational partners maintain multiple representations of common ground held with 
different individuals, with these representations being partner-specific (Metzing & 
Brennan, 2003), gradient (Brown-Schmidt, 2012), and tailored on an item-by-item basis 
(Heller, et al., 2012; Gorman, et al., 2013).  
Mechanisms of Audience Design  
A separate set of questions concern how representations of common ground are 
used in conversation, and what cognitive processes support audience design. 
When I compared the form of utterances designed for a single addressee as a 
function of whether the other partner was in the room, I found that the presence of the 
non-addressee did not significantly affect any aspect of referring I measured. This finding 
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suggests that even if the common ground shared with that person was automatically 
activated (Horton, 2007), that utterance design was guided by those representations 
shared with the intended addressee. An open question is whether the presence of a non-
addressee might influence other aspects of referring, and if so, in what circumstances this 
might be observed in (see Brown-Schmidt & Horton, 2014). One possibility is that 
representations associated with non-addressees may be more likely to guide language use 
in situations where the non-addressee is otherwise highly integral to the information at 
hand (see Eich, 1985). Another outstanding issue is the degree to which strategic choices 
are in play. To be sure, speakers can and do engage in strategic audience design, as in the 
case when actively deceiving someone. In the situations examined in the present 
experiments, however, audience design need not involve strategic choices. Instead, the 
attentional and memory mechanisms that support identification of the intended addressee, 
and retrieval of the mutual knowledge associated with them, could have produced the 
effects I saw here.   
How do speakers approach the problem of audience design in multiparty 
conversation? Here I proposed, and evaluated three candidate hypotheses regarding the 
way in which speakers might approach the problem of audience design in 3-party 
conversation (Experiment 2): Aim low (design expressions for the most naïve addressee), 
Aim high (design expressions for the most knowledgeable addressee), and Combining 
(combine the knowledge states of all addressees). Previous findings by Yoon and Brown-
Schmidt (2014) were equally consistent with the Aim low and the Combine accounts. By 
testing additional experimental conditions, Experiment 2 showed that in two-party 
conversation, speakers designed utterances for the naïve party. Utterances were equally 
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long when addressing two addressees (one knowledgeable, one naïve) as when 
addressing one naïve addressee, consistent with the Aim low hypothesis. There was no 
evidence to support an Aim high approach, despite the fact that one of the addressees had 
the same relevant knowledge as the speaker.  
Experiments 3-4 again examined whether speakers pursue an Aim Low approach 
in multiparty conversation, this time by manipulating addressees’ knowledge states in a 
group or in their immediate conversational contexts. As combined knowledge states 
decreased in 4- and 5-party conversation, expression length and rate of disfluency 
gradually increased, supporting the Combine hypothesis. Further, speakers promptly 
updated representations for both partners’ immediate contexts, and adjusted expressions 
depending on their immediate context and knowledge states. For instance, in Experiment 
4, when the naïve addressee had an easy context within which to identify the target, 
speakers did not Aim Low, but produced fairly short expressions. In the same experiment, 
when the knowledgeable addressee had a complex context, speakers added extra details 
to help the knowledgeable partner identify the referent. These findings are consistent with 
a view in which audience design in multiparty conversation is based on a combination of 
the perspectives of the addressees. 
 How do speakers combine the addressees’ perspectives? One possibility is that 
they calculate a mathematical average of knowledge states (while simultaneously 
maintaining the distinct representations of each addressee’s perspective; see discussion 
above). In this view, speakers equally consider the distinct needs of knowledgeable and 
naïve addressees – efficiency and informativity. If we make the simplifying assumption 
that the naïve addressee has 0% of the relevant knowledge, and the knowledgeable 
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addressee has 100% of the relevant knowledge, in the 3K1N, 2K2N, and 1K3N 
conditions, the overall mathematical average state is 75%, 50%, and 25% respectively. If 
audience design is based on the mathematical average knowledge state, in our task this 
would predict increased expression length as the average knowledge decreased.  
Another possibility is that speakers maintain distinct representations of the 
knowledge of each addressee, and then identify the most dominant knowledge state. This 
view predicts that speakers will prioritize either informativity or efficiency, depending on 
whether the dominant knowledge state is naïve or knowledgeable, respectively. Evidence 
consistent with this idea was the finding that when more than half of addressees were 
naïve (e.g., 1K2N or 1K3N), audience design emphasized informativity more than 
efficiency. That is, in Experiments 3-4, expression length approached an asymptote as the 
combined knowledge state decreased; this finding could have resulted from a mechanism 
in which speakers design with respect to the dominant knowledge state.   
 It is not clear, however, how a dominance mechanism would account for the 
findings in balanced groups. When the group knowledge was perfectly balanced, such as 
the 1K1N (Experiment 2) and the 2K2N condition in (Experiment 3b), speakers designed 
equally long expressions as when they talked to a naïve addressee. Taken together, the 
results of Experiments 2-4 support a view of audience design in which speakers take into 
account the knowledge states of all of the addressees (at least up to 4 addressees), and 
combine them in some way, possibly by averaging, possibly by identifying the dominant 
knowledge state.  
One thing to note in Experiment 3 is that the Director’s experience of entrainment 
was not consistent across conditions. For some conditions, such as the 2K1N condition in 
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Experiment 3a and the 3K1N condition in Experiment 3b, Directors performed multiple 
rounds of entrainment, while they had only one round of entrainment in other conditions 
(e.g., 1K or 1N conditions). Thus in our design, when more addressees knew the object 
labels, the speaker also had more egocentric knowledge. We opted for this design choice 
(where the Director sequentially establishes common ground with each knowledgeable 
Matcher separately) in order to keep the process of entrainment for a given Matcher 
consistent across conditions (always involving two people entraining on names). Whether 
this confounding role of the Director’s egocentric experience played a role in our findings 
during test trials remains to be explored. An important point to note however, is the fact 
that speakers produced equally long expressions for the first, second, and third Matchers 
during entrainment, regardless of their own egocentric knowledge. This finding suggests 
that the speaker’s egocentric knowledge likely had little-to-no influence on how speakers 
designed expressions during test.  
Another outstanding question is how group size affects the process of audience 
design. In Experiment 3, the number of partners in a group during test trials was not fully 
controlled: in the 1K and 1N condition, the Director addressed only one partner, whereas 
in the other conditions, the Director interacted with 3 or 4 partners. It remains an open 
question as to whether speakers design utterances differently when they talk to one or 
multiple partners with equivalent knowledge states (e.g., 1K vs. 3K (or 4K); 1N vs. 3N 
(or 4N)). A related question not addressed by the present research is what factors 
influence multiparty audience design. The answer to this question likely involves 
considerations of the relevant memory and attentional demands on the audience design 
process. For example, when addressing large groups, a summary extraction process may 
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generate representations of clusters of individuals, analogous to high-level visual 
processes such as implicit detection of the average emotion in a set of faces (Haberman & 
Whitney, 2010). Communicative goals may focus attention on some addressees more 
than others, influencing the process of audience design (see Yoon, Koh, & Brown-
Schmidt, 2012). When communication is rapid, faster activation of the mutual knowledge 
held with more knowledgeable addressees may bias the design process towards an Aim 
High approach. Fully understanding the malleability of the audience design process will 
likely involve comparisons of more complex communicative situations, with multiple 
potential addressees, and multiple types of communicative goals.  
The last unanswered question concerns the time-course of these processes, and at 
what point sensitivity to the perspective of the addressee(s) comes into play. While we 
find clear evidence for sensitivity to the addressee(s) perspective in the speaker’s 
initiating description of each object, an open question is when during the production 
process speakers access entrained terms, and plan additional descriptive material.  
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CHAPTER 3: MEMORY FOR THE DISCOURSE HISTORY 
Lexical differentiation refers to a discourse phenomenon in which speakers take 
into account past reference when designing new referring expressions, differentiating two 
sequentially presented objects from the same category (Van der Wege, 2009). The goal of 
the present research is to examine the locus of the lexical differentiation effect and its 
relationship with memory for past discourse referents. In Experiments 5 and 6, I elicit a 
differentiation effect in language production, and examine the situations in which it does 
and does not occur in order to understand the influence of the historical discourse context 
on referring. In Experiment 7, we examine the same question in situations that include an 
unmentioned, but target-related context item. Measures of memory for the discourse 
history in Experiments 5-7 are used to test whether poor memory for past referents 
explains the low incidence of differentiation, and listeners’ consequent lack of 
expectation for it (Yoon & Brown-Schmidt, 2013). 
Experiment 5 
According to Van Der Wege (2009), speakers lexically differentiate to prevent 
two different entities from having the same label, a process called “pre-emption by 
similar form” (also see Clark & Clark, 1979). For example, the speaker avoids giving the 
label, “the shirt”, to two different entities. By calling the second shirt “the striped shirt” 
or “the blouse”, the speaker is able to differentiate the two labels. The idea behind pre-
emption by similar form is that the previously used label “the shirt” pre-empts the 
subsequent use of the same label to refer to a different item, thus creating the need for 
lexical differentiation. If this view of the lexical differentiation effect is correct, 
differentiation should not be observed if the speaker had not labeled the first entity with 
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the basic object label. For example, if the speaker were to refer to the first shirt with a 
locative expression, such as “the top left one”, there would be no pre-emption of the label 
“the shirt”, and thus no need to describe the second shirt with a modifier (instead “the 
shirt” would be an appropriate label for the second shirt). Alternatively, the locus of the 
differentiation effect might be an attempt to distinguish current from past referents, 
regardless of how they had been named. If so, any previous reference to a shirt—with a 
locative or a descriptive expression—should increase the likelihood that the speaker 
would differentiate the second shirt from the first. 
 In the current experiment, I manipulate the way in which the first referent was 
referenced—with a locative, “the top left one”, or a descriptive phrase, “the shirt”—in 
order to test the locus of the lexical differentiation. In addition, I measure speakers’ and 
listeners’ memory for the discourse history.  
Method 
Participants 
 Seventy-two undergraduates (thirty-six pairs) at the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign participated in the experiment in return for partial course credit or 
cash payment ($8). Participants were native speakers of North American English with 
normal hearing and normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
Procedure 
The experiment consisted of two phases: a referential communication task 
followed by a memory test. The entire experiment lasted approximately 50 minutes. 
Referential Communication Task 
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During the referential communication task (Krauss & Weinheimer, 1966), two 
naïve participants were randomly assigned to the roles of speaking and listening and sat 
at separate computers in the same room. The computers were arranged so that 
participants could see each other’s faces but could not see each other’s computer screens. 
On each trial, the speaker and listener viewed a computer screen with four pictures. The 
pictures appeared in one of four different random positions on each screen. The target 
object was indicated to the speaker with a black box (see Figure 3.1). On the listener’s 
screen, the target was not indicated. The speaker’s task was to give the listener an 
instruction aloud to click on one of the four pictures (e.g., Click on the sock). The listener 
followed the speaker’s instructions on her own screen. The speaker was allowed to 
describe the target object in any way they saw fit, except for locative phrases (e.g., top 
right one), which speakers were instructed not to use. The task was interactive and 
participants were allowed to ask questions for clarification as needed. After the listener 
clicked the target, the speaker clicked the mouse once to advance to the next trial. 
Participants maintained their assigned role (i.e., as speaker or listener) throughout the 
task. Recordings of the speaker’s voice were saved directly to the computer. 
Materials 
 During the referential communication task, each participant completed a total of 
462 trials, including 198 entrainment trials, 33 test trials, and 231 filler trials. During the 
test trials (the focus of our analyses), the speaker described a “target” object from a 
particular category (e.g., a dotted sock). Each test trial was associated with 6 entrainment 
trials (see Figures 3.1a-1b). The type of entrainment trial served as the key experimental 
manipulation, and was manipulated within-subjects. These entrainment trials always 
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preceded test trials, and allowed us to manipulate whether the basic object label for a 
given test object, e.g., “sock” had already been used to describe a different item during 
entrainment. During both entrainment and test trials, the target object was presented with 
three other unrelated objects such that given the local context, a bare noun was sufficient 
to identify the target. These unrelated objects were rotated pseudo-randomly such that the 
three unrelated items varied from trial to trial. The critical question, then, was whether 
speakers would design referring expressions at test based on the historical discourse 
context. 
 
       (a)                                   (b) 
Figures 3.1a-b.  Experiments 5 and 6: Example stimuli from the referential 
communication task, including entrainment trials (1a) and test trials (1b). The target is 
indicated to the speaker by the black rectangle. The addressee’s screen would show the 
same four pictures, but in different locations and without the black box. This example 
shows the “contrast” condition; in the “no-contrast” condition, the target during 
entrainment would be an unrelated item such as an apple.  
 
In the Contrast-naming condition, the target on entrainment trials was an 
exemplar from the same category as the target on the test trial. For example, the speaker 
would describe an argyle sock 6 times during entrainment trials prior to describing the 
target dotted sock at test. During the entrainment trials I expected speakers to use the 
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basic object label, e.g., “sock” to describe the target (argyle sock). If speakers are 
sensitive to the historical discourse context, then during the associated test trial, they 
should differentiate their referring expression and describe the target with a modifier (e.g., 
the dotted sock).  
In the Non-contrast condition, participants described an unrelated object (e.g., 
apple) 6 times in entrainment, and then described the target object (e.g., dotted sock) at 
test. Note that for items in the Non-contrast condition, speakers never saw the contrast 
object.  
Lastly, in the Contrast-location condition, speakers described the location of the 
contrast object (e.g., top left one) 6 times, and the target object at test, using a (modified) 
noun phrase. The speaker was cued to use a locative phrase through an on-screen text 
prompt (e.g., “LOCATION”). This condition was included in order to test whether it is 
naming per se that is critical to eliciting the differentiation effect. 
Following entrainment, test displays showed four new (previously unseen) objects, 
including the target and three unrelated objects. While the target and the unrelated objects 
were all new tokens, the categories that they came from (e.g., socks, pigs, etc.) had all 
been previously experienced during the entrainment trials.  
Filler trials contained two contrasting objects from the same category (e.g., two 
fish) and two unrelated objects. Half of the time the target was one of the two contrasting 
objects and on the other half of filler trials, the target was one of the two unrelated objects. 
Filler trials with contrasting objects were included so that speakers would sometimes 
need to produce modified noun phrases based on the immediate context.  
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Entrainment and test trials for the different item sets were interspersed with filler 
trials in a pseudo-random order such that from the participants’ point of view, there was 
no distinction between the trial types, and so that all 7 trials associated with a single item 
set (6 entrainment trials followed by 1 test trial) occurred within a span of at most 120 
trials (ranged from 73 to 116, M=100.37, SD=12.4). Note that for a given object set, the 
maximum time between the final entrainment trial and the test trial was at most 15 trials 
(range of 1 to 15, M=7.39, SD=4.46).  
 All visual stimuli were pictures of every-day objects. The stimuli included the 33 
triplets of target (e.g., dotted sock), contrast (e.g., argyle sock), and unrelated items (e.g., 
apple) that were used as critical items across the three conditions. The remaining visual 
stimuli were used on filler trials and included 33 triplets of contrasting objects (e.g., 
opened box, wrapped box, stacked box) and 66 pairs of contrasting objects (e.g., sitting 
dog, jumping dog) from the same categories. All target items were counterbalanced 
across conditions across three lists. Each participant completed the items on one list. 
Memory test 
 Following the communication task, participants performed a surprise recognition 
memory test on their own computer (Figure 3.2). Each trial presented two pictures from 
the same category: One was an “old” picture that was presented during the 
communication task, while the other was a “new” picture from the same basic object 
category. Participants were asked to click the old picture on each trial. The old and new 
pictures were rotated across two lists, so that the old picture on one list was the new 
picture on the other list. A total of 99 trials tested memory for the 33 contrast items (e.g., 
argyle sock or apple), 33 target items (e.g., dotted sock), and 33 unrelated filler items 
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(e.g., drum). The correct answer for each trial was always the object that had been named 
or referenced with a locative phrase during the referential communication task. The 
speaker and listener were not allowed to talk to each other during this phase of the 
experiment.  
Figure 3.2. Experiments 5 and 6: Example stimuli from the memory test. 
 
Predictions 
The communication task was designed to replicate the lexical differentiation 
effect in language production (Van der Wege, 2009; Yoon & Brown-Schmidt, 2013). If 
speakers lexically differentiate, the modification rate (e.g., production of a modified 
expression like dotted sock vs. an unmodified expression like sock) should be higher in 
the Contrast-naming condition than in the Non-contrast condition. The design of this 
experiment also allows us to address the nature of the lexical differentiation effect per se. 
According to the process “pre-emption by similar form” suggested by Van Der Wege 
(2009), speakers produce lexically differentiated labels, so that they do not assign the 
same label to two different objects. If this account of the lexical differentiation effect is 
correct, speakers should be more likely to modify their referring expressions in the 
Contrast-naming condition compared to the Contrast-location conditions because it is 
only in the Contrast-naming condition that the basic object label for the target had 
! !
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previously been used (e.g., “sock” had been used on entrainment trials for a different 
referent). On the other hand, if mere exposure to two items from the same basic object 
category, rather than previous naming per se, is sufficient to elicit lexical differentiation, 
the rate of modifiers on test trials should be higher in both the Contrast-naming and 
Contrast-location conditions compared to the Non-contrast condition. 
 The relationship between performance in the memory task and the referential 
communication task will allow us to address two questions about the nature of the 
memory representations that support language use in dialogue. The first question is why 
the differentiation rate in previous studies was so low. For example, speakers 
differentiated only 7.5% of the time in Yoon and Brown-Schmidt (2013) and 26% in Van 
der Wege (2009). One explanation is that successful differentiation requires memory for 
the contrast object, and that low rates of differentiation result from poor memory for the 
contrast. If so, I would predict that successful recognition of contrast objects will predict 
the higher differentiation rate. Such a finding would point to memory as the critical factor 
determining whether speakers will design expressions with respect to the historical 
discourse record.   
Our second question concerns potential asymmetries in the representation of the 
discourse record between speakers and listeners. Recall that Yoon and Brown-Schmidt 
(2013) observed that whereas speakers sometimes differentiated current from past 
referents, there was no evidence that listeners ever anticipated differentiation. Here I test 
if this asymmetry is due to speakers and listeners forming different memories of the 
discourse history. If speakers are more sensitive to the discourse history than listeners, 
this would explain the presence of a lexical differentiation effect for speakers but not 
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listeners. Such a finding would be expected if the generation effect in memory research 
(Marsh, et al., 2001) extends to more natural conversational settings. By contrast, if 
conversational partners align at every level of representation (Pickering & Garrod, 2004), 
speakers and listeners should exhibit similar performance on the memory test. 
Results 
Referential communication task 
Speakers’ recorded object descriptions were transcribed and coded for whether 
their referring expressions were modified or not (Figure 3.3). I analyzed the data in a 
logistic mixed effects model with entrainment type (Non-contrast, Contrast-location, and 
Contrast-naming) as a fixed effect, and subjects and items as random intercepts. The 
dependent variable was whether the speaker used a modifier or not. Full model details are 
presented in Appendix B.  
While bare noun phrases were common in all three conditions, speakers 
differentiated locally unique referents with modified noun phrases significantly more 
often when the contrast object had previously been discussed (21.9%, Contrast-naming vs. 
20.8% and Contrast-location condition) than when it had not (14.1%, Non-contrast 
condition) (z=2.194, p<.01). The rate of modified noun phrases between the two contrast 
conditions was not significantly different (z=0.067, p>.05). The size of the differentiation 
effect was 7.8%7, similar to the previous findings in Yoon & Brown-Schmidt (2013).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!7!One question about this finding is whether the lag between the last entrainment trial and 
the test trial modulates the differentiation effect (the lag varied between 1 and 15 trials). If 
speakers fail to differentiate after long lags, this would be consistent with the memory-based 
explanation for why speakers differentiate so infrequently. The results of this post-hoc analysis, 
however, showed that neither the main effect of lag (z=-0.826, p>.05), nor the interactions with 
condition (Non-contrast vs. Contrast-location & Contrast-naming: z=-0.301, p>.05; Contrast-
location vs. Contrast-naming: z=0.994, p>.05) were significant.  
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In summary, these findings replicate the lexical differentiation effect (Van der 
Wege, 2009; Yoon & Brown-Schmidt, 2013), demonstrating that speakers design 
expressions with respect to the historical discourse record (Brennan & Clark, 1996). 
Critically, however, there was not a significant difference in modification rates between 
the Contrast-location and Contrast-naming conditions. This finding suggests that speakers 
differentiate not to avoid lexical conflict (cf., Van der Wege, 2009). Instead, speakers 
differentiate in order to distinguish current referents from past referents, regardless of 
how those referents had been labeled.  
 
Figure 3.3. Percentage of each noun phrase type on target trials during communication 
task in Experiment 5.  
 
Memory test  
I test memory for the contrast to address the question whether the low rate of 
lexical differentiation is due to memory failures. I also compare memory performance by 
speakers and listeners to evaluate whether they developed distinct memory 
representations of the discourse. Overall, both speakers and listeners successfully 
recognized contrast and target items over 80% of the time (Figure 3.4), suggesting the 
low differentiation rates for target item in the communication task were not due to poor 
memory for past referents. 
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Figure 3.4. Experiment 5: Accuracy on two-alternative forced choice recognition 
memory task for contrast items (left bars) and target items (right bars) by speakers and 
listeners. 
 
 Memory accuracy data were analyzed in a logistic mixed effects model with role 
(listener vs. speaker), referent (contrast vs. target), and entrainment type (Non-contrast vs. 
Contrast-location vs. Contrast-naming) as fixed effects (see Appendix B for model 
details). Overall, speakers had better memory than listeners (z=2.781, p<.05). Memory 
was also better for contrast than target items, which is unsurprising, as contrast items 
were referenced 6 times during the communication task, whereas target items were 
referenced only once (z=-5.173, p<.05).  
 Planned comparisons explored a significant interaction between role and referent 
type (z=3.099, p<.05) by examining the role effect for contrast and target items separately. 
Memory for contrasts was high for both speakers and listeners (>95%) (z=-0.136, p>.05), 
likely reflecting a ceiling effect. By contrast, speakers remembered target items 
significantly better than listeners (94.9% vs. 86.5%; z=5.616, p<.05). These findings 
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suggest that the gap between speakers’ and listeners’ memory for previous referents 
attenuates with repeated exposure. 
Relationship between production and comprehension 
 The fact that recognition of contrast items was uniformly high is inconsistent with 
the idea that speakers fail to differentiate when memory traces for the contrast object 
were weak. I tested whether speakers’ memory for the contrast predicted the 
differentiation rate and the results of that analysis revealed the differentiation rate was not 
significantly influenced by contrast memory (z=-0.426, p>.05). 
While there was no evidence that contrast memory modulated use of a modifier 
on test trials, an open question is whether use a modifier on test trials improves memory 
for the target. One reason to think that modification might improve memory for the 
referent is that the process of selecting an appropriate modifier necessarily requires more 
elaborate encoding (Bradshaw & Anderson, 1982) of that object (e.g., saying striped shirt 
requires conceptualizing of the shirt as striped). However, the results of this post-hoc 
analysis showed that when speakers described target objects with modifiers, memory for 
targets did not improve for speakers or listeners (z=0.027, p>.05).   
Summary and Discussion 
 In summary, the results of Experiment 5 showed that speakers were more likely to 
use modifiers when they had previously referenced an item from the same basic object 
category, replicating previous findings (Van der Wege, 2009; Yoon & Brown-Schmidt, 
2013). However, naming was not necessary to elicit lexical differentiation. This finding is 
inconsistent with the argument that differentiation is motivated by pre-emption by a 
similar referential form (Van der Wege, 2009). Instead, speakers differentiate in order to 
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distinguish the current referent from past referents—regardless of how those past 
referents had been labeled.  
Recognition memory for past referents was high, consistent with findings in the 
memory literature that recognition memory for pictures tends to be quite good (Shepard, 
1967). I also observed that speakers had better memory for target objects; whether 
memory for contrast objects follows a similar pattern was obfuscated by near-ceiling 
performance. The lack of a relationship between memory for the contrast item and the 
differentiation rate suggests that failures to link the current context with the past context 
are not due to failures to remember that past context.  
Experiment 6 
The aim of Experiment 6 was to replicate Experiment 5 with a lower number of 
entrainment trials in order to equate exposure to target and contrast items. In addition, 
participants in Experiment 6 alternated roles of speaking and listening to address the 
possibility that lower recognition rates on the part of listeners was due to poor task 
engagement. While the speaker-memory advantage in Experiment 5 is consistent with a 
generation effect, speakers also had a more active role in the conversation. The required 
commitment to both roles in a conversation in Experiment 6 should decrease the 
possibility of differences in engagement. 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-six undergraduates (forty-eight pairs) at the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign participated in return for partial course credit or cash ($8). 
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Participants were native speakers of North American English. None had participated in 
Experiment 5. 
Materials and Procedure 
The procedure of Experiment 6 was identical to Experiment 5 with the following 
exceptions: First, during the communication task, the two participants first completed 20 
practice trials (2 blocks of 10 trials each), followed by two blocks of trials in the 
communication task. Participants alternated between the roles of speaking and listening 
in each block. During the practice trials, they were introduced to both roles of speaking 
and listening to get accustomed to the task. Second, I included a 20-minute break 
between the communication task and the memory test in an attempt to avoid a ceiling 
effect on the memory test. 
The design of the communication task was also slightly different. Each participant 
completed a total of 200 trials, including 20 practice, 36 entrainment, 36 test, and 108 
filler trials. Note that unlike Experiment 5, in Experiment 6 each target item was 
associated with a single entrainment trial in order to equate exposure to contrast and 
target objects prior to the memory test. The experimental conditions were the same as in 
Experiment 5 (Non-contrast, Contrast-location, Contrast-naming conditions), and were 
manipulated within-subjects.8 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!8!I also manipulated the lag between the entrainment and the test trial (1 vs. 10 trials) to examine 
whether the differentiation effect might be more pronounced at shorter lags. In the 1-lag condition, 
the entrainment trial for a given item (e.g., the argyle sock) was immediately followed by the test 
trial for that item (e.g., the dotted sock). By contrast, in the 10-lag condition, the test trial 
occurred 10 trials after the entrainment trial. We expected that if lexical differentiation is 
sensitive to the recency of exposure to contrast item, speakers may be more likely to differentiate 
when the lag between the contrast and target is short. However, neither the main effect of lag 
(z=0.814, p>.05), nor the interactions between lag and entrainment type were significant (ps>.05), 
suggesting that the low rates of differentiation (~4%) were not simply due to long lags between 
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 After the referential communication task, there was a 20-minute break during 
which participants completed an unrelated distractor test (quantitative math test). 
Following the break, participants completed the unexpected memory test. As in 
Experiment 5, each test trial on the memory test showed two pictures from the same 
category, one of which was “old” and one of which was “new”. The task was to click the 
old picture. There were a total of 108 trials that were presented in a randomized order that 
tested memory for the 36 contrast items, 36 target items, and 36 of the filler items. The 
experiment lasted about 60 minutes in total.  
Predictions 
During the communication task, I predicted that speakers would produce modified 
noun phrases more often in Contrast-naming condition than the Non-contrast condition, 
replicating the lexical differentiation effect. If previous reference to the contrast item is 
sufficient to prompt lexical differentiation, modification rates should be equally high in 
the Contrast-naming and Contrast-location conditions, despite the fact that the contrast is 
not named in the Contrast-location condition.  
 In the present experiment, participants alternated roles between speaking and 
listening to better equate task engagement. If speakers continue to outperform listeners 
during the memory test, this would provide more convincing evidence that speakers and 
listeners formulate distinct memory representations for discourse referents during 
conversation. In contrast, if the distinct memory performance between speakers and 
listeners in Experiment 5 was due to differential engagement, I would expect speakers 
and listeners to perform equivalently on the memory test. Finally, by equating the number !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
trials. As a result we do not discuss the manipulation of lag further (and adding lag to the models 
did not improve model fit).!
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of exposures to contrast and target items, I anticipated that any effects of participant role 
(speaker vs. listener) should obtain for both targets and contrasts. 
Results 
Referential communication task 
As in Experiment 5, I transcribed the speakers’ productions on test trials and 
coded whether they produced a bare noun phrase or a modified noun phrase (Figure 3.5). 
In the Non-contrast condition, speakers modified their expressions 19.4% of the time, 
whereas modification rates were higher in both the Contrast-location (23.0%) and 
Contrast-naming conditions (23.7%). 
 
Figure 3.5. Percentage of each noun phrase type on test trials during entrainment in 
Experiment 6.  
 
 I analyzed the modification rates in a logistic mixed effects model with a binomial 
link function, using lag and entrainment type as fixed effects (see details in Appendix B). 
The analysis revealed a significant main effect of entrainment (Non-contrast vs. Contrast-
location & Contrast-naming; z=2.270, p<.05), consistent with the results of Experiment 1. 
Speakers tended to differentiate the current referent from the past referent more when 
they had previously referenced the contrast item (regardless of whether it was named or 
spatially located), compared to when they had not been exposed to the contrast. The 
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modification rates in the Contrast-location and Contrast-naming conditions did not differ 
significantly (z=0.203, p>.05).  
 
Figure 3.6. Accuracy on the memory test in Experiment 6. 
 
Memory test phrase 
Accuracy on the memory test was overall high for both speakers and listeners, 
though not at ceiling, unlike Experiment 5 (see Figure 3.6). I analyzed accuracy in a 
maximal mixed effects model with participant role (listener vs. speaker), referent 
(contrast vs. target) and entrainment types (Non-contrast vs. Contrast-location vs. 
Contrast-naming) as fixed effects (see details in Appendix B). Overall, speakers had 
better memory than listeners (z=4.181, p<.05). Memory was notably lower in the 
Contrast-location condition than the other two conditions (Non-contrast vs. Contrast-
location & Contrast-naming: z=-2.552, p<.05; Contrast-location vs. Contrast-naming: 
z=3.677, p<.05). These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction between 
referent type (contrast vs. target) and entrainment type (Contrast-location vs. Contrast-
naming, z=-2.413, p<.05), and a significant three-way interaction between role (listener 
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vs. speaker), referent type (contrast vs. target), and entrainment type (Contrast-location vs. 
Contrast-naming, z=-1.646, p<.05).  
Separate planned analyses for contrast and target items were used to explore the 
interactions. For target items, there was only a main effect of role, due to better memory 
performance by speakers (z=3.842, p<.05). For contrast items, there was a significant 
interaction between role and entrainment type (z=3.292, p<.05): Whereas speakers had 
better memory in the Contrast-naming than the Contrast-location condition (z=2.363, 
p<.05), listeners’ memory did not differ across these conditions (z=0.340, p>.05). These 
findings show that speakers’ memory for the contrast item was boosted more by naming 
than listeners’ memory for the contrast.  
Relationship between production and comprehension 
In Experiment 5, I did not observe a significant relationship between language use 
and memory for the discourse context, possibly due to ceiling memory performance for 
the contrast item. In Experiment 6, I again examined whether speakers’ contrast memory 
predicts the rate of differentiation, and did not find any significant evidence for an 
influence of contrast memory on the differentiation rate (z=1.382, p>.05). 
As in Experiment 5, I also examined whether the way in which a target item was 
described affected how it was remembered. A mixed-effects model included role, 
entrainment type, and whether the target item was modified as fixed effects; the 
dependent measure was whether the target object was correctly recognized during the 
memory test. The results of this analysis revealed that when speakers had described the 
target with a modifier, both speakers and listeners remembered the referent better, 
compared to situations when the referent was identified by a bare noun phrase (z=3.916, 
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p<.05). This result suggests that modification is helpful for future memory. There was no 
interaction with role or entrainment type. 
Summary and Discussion 
In summary, the results of Experiment 6 demonstrated a lexical differentiation 
effect that was not contingent on naming (cf. Van Der Wege, 2009). The small magnitude 
of the effect, a ~4% increase in modification when an object from the same basic object 
category had previously been referenced, may be due to the fact that the contrast item had 
only been seen once during entrainment (vs. 6 times in Experiment 5).  Performance on 
the surprise memory test demonstrated that speakers had better memory for past referents 
than listeners. Naming (rather than locating) past referents boosted speakers’ memory for 
contrast items. Lastly, memory was improved for items that were described with 
modified noun phrases, providing evidence for a link between referential language and 
memory for the discourse. One caveat to this last finding, however, is that speakers were 
in control of whether they modified or not, so uncontrolled item differences may be 
influencing this effect.  
Experiment 7 
Experiments 5 and 6 show that speakers and listeners form distinct memories of 
the discourse record. Speakers’ memory for previous discourse referents was overall 
better, and naming more strongly influenced speaker memory. While naming per se was 
not directly related to lexical differentiation, it was helpful for future memory.  
A question not addressed by Experiments 5 and 6 is whether speakers have 
superior memory for undiscussed aspects of the referential context as well. If successful 
reference involves consideration of the referential alternatives in the discourse context 
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(Olson, 1970; Pechmann, 1989), then speakers should have better memory for 
unmentioned items in the scene. However, some findings in the memory literature 
suggest that listeners should have better context memory than speakers (Gopie & 
MacLeod, 2009; Jurica & Shimamura, 1999). According to this view, the act of speaking 
puts the speaker’s attentional focus on the referent, at the expense of attention to the 
context (Koriat, et al., 1991). By contrast, listeners distribute attention more broadly, 
supporting better context memory. However, the findings, which support this view, come 
from paradigms that are not representative of conversational settings (e.g. speakers read 
sentences to imagined addressees).  
The aim of the present study was to examine whether the observed speaking 
benefit for memory for the discourse, extends to memory for unmentioned aspects of the 
discourse context as well.  
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-six undergraduates (forty-eight pairs) at the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign participated in return for partial course credit or cash payment ($8). 
Participants were native speakers of North American English and had normal hearing and 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. No participant took part in Experiments 5 or 6.  
Materials and procedure 
The general procedure of Experiment 7 was identical to Experiment 6. Pairs of 
participants completed a communication task during which they alternated between the 
roles of speaker and listener in each block, followed by a 20-minute break and then a 
surprise memory test.    
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               (a)            (b) 
Figures 3.7a-b. Example stimuli from entrainment trials (7a) and test trials (7b) in 
Experiment 7. Note that the context item (e.g., striped sock) in entrainment trials was 
never mentioned. 
 
  
As before, the three types of entrainment trials (Non-contrast, Contrast-location, 
and Contrast-naming) formed our conditions of interest. One small change to the format 
of the entrainment trials was made, in order to test speakers’ and listeners’ memory for 
previously unmentioned items from the discourse context. Unlike Experiments 5 and 6, I 
included a contrasting context item (e.g., striped sock) during entrainment trials (See 
Figure 3.7a). In the entrainment trials of the Contrast-location and Contrast-naming 
conditions, participants viewed two items from the same category (e.g., argyle sock and 
striped sock), as well as two unrelated items. Speakers referred to one of two items (e.g., 
argyle sock) during the entrainment trial; the other object (e.g., striped sock) was never 
mentioned. Because two items from the same basic object category were in the 
immediate context, I expected speakers to use modifiers during the entrainment phase in 
the Contrast-naming condition (e.g., “argyle sock”, rather than “sock”). For consistency 
in terminology across the experiments, I will refer to the mentioned object as the 
“contrast item”, and the unmentioned object from the same basic object category as the 
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“context item”. As in Experiments 5-6, in the Non-contrast condition, neither the contrast 
nor the context object was shown to participants, and speakers named an unrelated object 
during entrainment (e.g., apple).  
 Following the communication task, participants performed the same unrelated 
task as in previous experiments for 20 minutes and then completed an unexpected 
memory test. Unlike Experiments 5 and 6, I used a yes/no recognition memory test. On 
each trial, there was a single picture on the screen and participants were instructed to 
press the “Y” key if the picture was an old one that they had seen during the 
communication task and to press the “N” key, if the picture was new. In the two-
alternative forced choice task used in Experiments 5 and 6, each memory test trial 
contained an old object, thus participants were forced to choose the more familiar picture 
even in cases where they were highly uncertain. In contrast, the yes/no recognition task 
used in Experiment 7 allows us to continue testing recognition memory, but in a task that 
allows participants to reject pictures (and say “new”) in cases where they fail to recognize 
an item. Participants completed 264 randomly ordered recognition test trials. Half of the 
pictures were old items and the other half were new. The old items included 36 contrast 
(e.g., argyle sock or apple), 36 target (e.g., dotted sock), 24 context (e.g., striped sock), 
and 36 filler items. The 132 new objects were drawn from the same category as each old 
item (e.g., three different new socks). Thus, during the memory test, participants were 
exposed to 6 different items from the same category; three were old and the other three 
were new. The order of test trials was random.  
Predictions 
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The entrainment trials in Experiment 7 contained two objects from the same 
category (the contrast and context objects), thus speakers needed to use a modifier in 
order to uniquely identify the contrast object in the Contrast-naming condition. On test 
trials, a modified noun phrase was not necessary given the local context, since all items 
were from different basic object category. If, as in Experiments 5-6, speakers lexically 
differentiate in order to distinguish the current referent from past referents, the 
modification rate should be higher in the two contrast conditions compared to the Non-
contrast condition.  
 With respect to memory for the discourse, I expected that speakers would 
continue to have better performance than listeners for both target and contrast items. The 
main question addressed by this study is whether this speaker benefit for past referents 
extends to unmentioned items in the visual context. If the process of designing an 
appropriately informative referring expression supports encoding of both the referent and 
its context, speakers should remember context items better than listeners. In contrast, if 
the act of speaking focuses attention on the referent at the expense of items in the context, 
listeners should show better memory for context items than speakers (Gopie & MacLeod, 
2009; Koriat, et al., 1991).  
Results 
Communication task 
Speakers almost always used modifiers (99.5%) to identify the target on 
entrainment trials in the Contrast-naming condition. On test trials, in the Non-contrast 
condition, speakers modified their expressions 16.3% of the time, while modification 
rates were higher in both the Contrast-location (20.2%) and Contrast-naming conditions 
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(24.7%). The analysis of target descriptions on test trials revealed that speakers used 
modifiers to lexically differentiate past referents (Figure 3.8). Modification rates were 
analyzed in a mixed effects model with entrainment type as a fixed effect (see Appendix 
B). The results revealed a main effect of entrainment type (NC vs. CN & CL: z=4.116, 
p<.05), due to significantly higher rate of modified noun phrases in both contrast 
conditions compared to the Non-contrast condition. Consistent with the results of 
Experiments 5-6, the modification rate did not differ significantly between the two 
contrast conditions (z=1.798, p>.05).  
 
Figure 3.8. Percentage of each noun phrase type on test trials in Experiment 7.  
 
Memory test phase  
Performance on the memory task is plotted in Figure 3.9. in terms of the 
participants’ ability to discriminate old from new items, or d’. Discriminability (d’) was 
calculated by subtracting standardized false alarm rate from standardized hit rate. The use 
of the d’ measure is preferred over other accuracy measures because it allows us to partial 
out the effects of response bias. The data were analyzed in three mixed effects models, 
which examined memory separately for target, contrast, and context items (note that an 
omnibus model with all three object types was not possible because the Non-contrast 
condition did not contain a context item). In all models, role (speaker vs. listener), 
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entrainment (Non-contrast, Contrast-naming, Contrast-location) and item type (old vs. 
new) were included as fixed effects. Item type (old vs. new) was included as a fixed 
effect in order to separate correct acceptance of old items and correct rejections of new 
items from response bias (see Wright, Horry, & Skagerberg, 2008; Fraundorf, Watson, & 
Benjamin, 2010). Significant effects of item type show that participants were highly 
successful at discriminating old from new items; condition by item type interactions test 
whether condition influenced sensitivity to this distinction between old and new items. 
The dependent measure was binary; it coded whether the response on the memory test 
was ‘yes’ (old) or ‘no’ (new) (See Appendix for full model details).  
For target items, speakers had better memory than listeners (target: z=-2.961, 
p<.01), consistent with Experiment 6. Target memory was also better in the Non-contrast 
condition than the other two conditions (z=7.113, p<.01), possibly due to confusion 
created by exposure to multiple items from the same category in the contrast conditions 
(i.e., Benjamin, 2001; Roediger & McDermott, 1995).  
For contrast items, speakers had better memory than listeners (z=-3.503, p<.05). 
In addition, memory performance was substantially worse in the Contrast-location 
condition compared to the other two conditions (z=-9.618, p<.05). These effects were 
qualified by a three-way interaction between item type, role (speaker vs. listener), and 
entrainment type (z=2.046, p<.05): Speakers had better memory than listeners when the 
contrast had been labeled (Non-contrast: z=-3.500, p<.05; Contrast-naming: z=-3.773, 
p<.05), but not when it had been located (Contrast-location: z=-0.812, p>.05).  
For context items, which were a newly included item category in Experiment 7, 
the analysis only included the two entrainment conditions for which a context item was 
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present during entrainment (Contrast-naming and Contrast-location). Unlike target and 
contrast memory, speakers did not remember context items better (z=-0.173, p<.05). 
While context item memory was better in the Contrast-naming condition than in the 
Contrast-location condition (z=-9.162, p<.05), this effect did not differ as a function of 
participant role (z = -0.82, p = .42). Thus, naming the referent improved context memory 
for both speakers and listeners. These findings suggest that the speaker’s superior 
memory for past referents does not extend to memory for unmentioned aspects of the 
discourse context.  
 
Figure 3.9. Discriminability (d’) on the memory test in Experiment 3. Error bars indicate 
by-participant standard error of the mean. 
 
Relationship between referential form and memory  
 As in Experiments 5 and 6, the relationship between referential form during the 
communication task and memory for past referents was examined. Consistent with the 
results of Experiments 5-6, the lexical differentiation rate was not related to contrast 
memory (z=-0.579, p>.05). 
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 An analysis of the relationship between referential form on target trials and 
subsequent target memory revealed that interlocutors remembered target items better 
when they had been described during the test phase with modified noun phrases than 
when they had been described with bare noun phrases (z=-2.026, p<.05), consistent with 
the results of Experiment 6. 
Summary and Discussion 
 The results of Experiment 7 again demonstrated a clear differentiation effect in 
the communication task that was not linked to naming. In addition, memory for previous 
discourse referents was better for speakers than for listeners. Though this benefit for past 
referents did not extend to unmentioned aspects of the discourse context (context items) 
selectively for speakers, naming (rather than locating) an intended referent did boost 
memory for unmentioned aspects of the discourse context for both speakers and listeners.  
General discussion 
Lexical differentiation and its source 
 The results of Experiments 5-7 replicate the lexical differentiation effect and 
reveal several new phenomena that hint at its origin. One explanation of the effect is that 
speakers differentiate in order to avoid using the same label (e.g., sock) to describe two 
different exemplars (Van der Wege, 2009). To test this hypothesis, the current studies 
included a condition in which the speaker used a locative phrase to identify the contrast 
object (e.g., the top left one), thus avoiding the potential for lexical conflict at test. Across 
the three experiments, however, the differentiation rate did not differ as a function of 
whether the contrast item had been located or labeled, suggesting that lexical conflict is 
not the source of differentiation (21.3% in the Contrast-location vs. 23.4% in the 
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Contrast-naming condition). Instead, it seems that speakers differentiate in order to more 
generally distinguish current from past referents. 
The fact that speakers differentiated both in the locative and labeling conditions 
also clarifies an earlier puzzling finding.  Yoon and Brown-Schmidt (2013) showed that 
listeners were equally likely to expect speakers to produce a modified noun phrase to 
describe a target referent when a contrasting referent had previously been located vs. 
labeled. Although they suggested that listeners did not expect speakers to differentiate, 
the present results offer a different interpretation of those findings. In that study, listeners 
may have been sensitive to the fact that differentiation can be prompted by previous 
reference to a similar object in the past, regardless of the form of that reference.  
 Lexical differentiation is also observed under conditions in which speakers had 
already used a modifier to describe the contrast object. In Experiment 7, describing the 
target item with a bare noun phrase would be sufficient to identify the target with respect 
to both the local and historical context, as contrast items in the Contrast-naming condition 
were described during entrainment with a modifier 99.5% of the time (e.g., argyle sock). 
As a result, an unmodified description of the target (e.g., sock, rather than dotted sock) 
would suffice to distinguish the target from the contrast. The fact that speakers produced 
modifiers on test trials at similar rates in Experiments 6 and 7 (23.7% and 24.7%, 
respectively) adds to the evidence that it is the distinction between referents and not 
referential form that gives rise to the lexical differentiation effect. 
 Lastly, recognition memory for the contrast item was high for speakers and 
listeners alike. These findings suggest that the low differentiation rate (about 5% in these 
experiments) is not caused by the speaker’s failure to remember the contrast item. An 
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alternative explanation of the low differentiation rate may be that speakers viewed the 
previous discourse as irrelevant to the current discourse context—that is, that the 
memories were intact but not accessed. In a conversation in which the past was relevant 
to the topic at hand, differentiation might be more pronounced. A final consideration is 
that memory was tested using a recognition paradigm. An open question is whether the 
relationship between memory and lexical differentiation would be more pronounced if 
memory was measured in a free-recall task. While the recall rate for conversational 
memory is generally low (Stafford & Daly, 1984), the act of recalling information from 
memory may be more similar to what speakers do when they bring to mind past discourse 
contexts and relate them to the current topic of conversation. 
Distinct memory representations for speakers and listeners 
 Interlocutors are thought to maintain representations of the discourse context in 
the form of rich representations of joint experiences (Clark & Marshall, 1978; Brown-
Schmidt, 2012), and through the automatic association of partners and referents (Horton 
& Gerrig, 2005a). Here we examined whether speakers and listeners develop distinct 
memory representations while communicating.  
 Memory performance was quite good for both speakers and listeners, even in 
Experiments 6 and 7 where a 20-minute break was introduced between the 
communication task and the unexpected memory test. This finding is generally consistent 
with the idea that discourse representations are maintained over time, even in a task-
based dialogue where there is little pressure to remember previous topics. However, 
consistent differences in memory performance between speakers and listeners imply that 
the representation of the discourse record varies as a function of one’s role in a discourse. 
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The fact that the speaker advantage obtained even in Experiments 6 and 7, where 
participants alternated roles of speaking and listening, suggests that this speaker-benefit 
operates at the level of individual utterances within the discourse (see also McKinley et 
al., 2015). Notably, the speaker benefit did not extend to unmentioned aspects of the 
discourse context (Experiment 7, context memory).  
Why does speaking improve referent memory? One explanation is that speakers 
invest more effort into the planning of utterances compared to the amount of effort 
needed to interpret the same utterance. This asymmetric effort explanation is consistent 
with the idea that the act of generating material increases the mental effort or depth of 
processing during encoding (Graf, 1980; McFarland et al., 1980, Slamecka & Graf, 1978). 
This view predicts that speakers who invest more effort during encoding should perform 
better on subsequent memory tests. While we have no direct evidence that would speak to 
this hypothesis, the fact that the use of a modified noun phrase on target trials (e.g., 
spotted sock vs. sock) improved subsequent target memory is generally consistent with 
this idea.  
 An alternative possibility is that interlocutors develop different strategies to 
encode information depending on their role as speaker or listener. The act of speaking 
requires utterance planning and may place more focus on the referent at the expense of 
attention to the immediate context (see Gopie & MacLeod, 2009; Jurica & Shimamura, 
1999; Koriat et al., 1991; cf. Brown-Schmidt & Tanenhaus, 2006; McKinley et al., 2015). 
By contrast, listening requires evaluating the unfolding speech signal with respect to the 
candidate referents in the discourse context (Eberhard, Spivey-Knowlton, Sedivy, & 
Tanenhaus, 1995), and as a result may improve encoding of both the intended referent as 
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well as the alternatives in the local context. While our findings do show the predicted 
speaker benefit on this account, there was no evidence that this was at the expense of 
memory for the context. Similar to recent findings by McKinley et al. (under review), 
speakers and listeners showed equivalent context memory that was improved—regardless 
of role—when the speaker named the object rather than located it.  
Context memory 
It is known that the historical record of a discourse (i.e., memory for the discourse 
history) includes representations of events and their participants, as well as how past 
referents have been described (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Greene, Gerrig, McKoon, & 
Ratcliff, 1994; Nieuwland, Otten, & Van Berkum, 2007). Less clear is whether 
unmentioned objects in the discourse context are encoded in memory as well, and if so, 
how they are bound or linked to referenced items. In Experiment 7, when speakers had to 
describe the target using a modified noun phrase to distinguish it from the context item 
(Contrast-naming condition), memory for the context items was comparable to that for 
memory for targets, and similar for speakers (target d’=1.45; context d’=1.32) and 
listeners (target d’= 1.12; context d’=1.23). By contrast, memory for context items 
decreased dramatically when the speaker produced a locative (Context-location 
condition; speaker: context d’=0.16, listener: d’=0.43). These findings show that there is 
flexibility in how a discourse context is (or is not) encoded. Speakers and listeners do not 
automatically encode everything in the context, but instead selectively encode 
information that is conversationally-relevant.  
Context in the present studies was defined as the referential context. Designing an 
appropriate referring expression in Experiment 7 required taking into consideration the 
! 104!
properties of both the target and the context item in order to select words that would 
uniquely identify the target. For example, given the scene at entrainment in Figure 3.7a, 
modified expressions such as the tall sock or the multicolored sock would not suffice to 
identify the target; instead the speaker would have to take both the target and the context 
item into consideration to select an expression that uniquely picks out the target such as 
the argyle sock. This joint consideration of both an intended referent and its local context 
may support context memory in natural conversation. Whether other types of contexts 
(such as memory for one’s discourse partner) may be similarly boosted in natural 
conversation remains an open question. The present research also does not address how 
unmentioned and irrelevant aspects of the discourse context are encoded in memory. For 
example, in Figure 3.7a, the bunny and the pie were never mentioned and were largely 
irrelevant to describing the target (sock); whether naming (rather than locating) the target 
would boost memory for these irrelevant context objects is unknown. If the memory 
boost for the context object in the naming condition was due to the relevance of the 
context object to the target, this naming benefit would likely not extend to irrelevant 
aspects of the context.   
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION 
During conversation, interlocutors establish representations of what each other do 
and don’t know; these representations of mutual knowledge guide language use (Brennan 
& Clark, 1996; Metzing & Brennan, 2003; Brown-Schmidt, 2009). Speakers design their 
utterances based on the knowledge and perspective of the addressee, and memory 
representations of this mutual knowledge, or common ground, are necessary for 
successful audience design. Previous studies of two party conversation showed that 
speakers are sensitive to the common ground shared with their partners (Schober & Clark, 
1989; Isaacs & Clark, 1987; Krauss & Weinheimer, 1964, 1966; Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 
1992; Van der Wege, 2009; Yoon & Brown-Schmidt, 2014). How these processes scale 
up to more complex settings, including multiparty conversation is unknown. Further, 
little is known about how mutual knowledge is stored in memory during natural 
conversation. One goal of the present research was to use multiparty conversation as a 
test case in order to provide insight into how perspective is represented, and how these 
representations are brought to bear on the process of audience design. Another goal was 
to use the phenomenon of lexical differentiation in order to explore links between 
language use and memory for the discourse context.  
In Chapter 2, I show that speakers develop and maintain distinct and gradient 
representations of the common ground held with different individuals, and use these 
representations to guide audience design. In multiparty conversation, speakers 
emphasized both the knowledgeable and the naïve addressees’ distinct perspectives and 
designed their referential expressions accordingly. Taken together, the findings point to 
an audience design process that considers all of the addressees’ distinct representations of 
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common ground, where speakers flexibly take into consideration all of the addressees’ 
knowledge states to maximize the understanding of all addressees in multiparty 
conversation. 
In multiparty conversation, identifying the circumstances in which speakers 
depart from a Combine approach to audience design remains a goal for future work; such 
inquiries will likely benefit from considering the relevant behavioral goals that are 
motivating the conversation in the first place. Speakers are under pressure to maintain 
both conversational efficiency and informativity. Depending on conversational goals, 
they may approach audience design in a way that emphasizes one of these goals more 
than the other. Likewise, there are likely to be limits on the number of individuals for 
whom speakers can maintain distinct representations of common ground; identifying 
these limits is a goal for future work. 
 In Chapter 3, the present research replicates and extends previous findings, 
demonstrating that speakers differentiate their referring expressions to distinguish current 
from past referents. By investigating the relationship between language use in dialogue 
and memory for the discourse, I show that low rates of differentiation are not due to 
failures to remember the past context; instead recognition memory for past discourse 
referents is quite good. Further, the findings demonstrate a generation effect for item 
memory in a natural conversational setting, pointing to an asymmetry in memory 
between speakers and listeners. This is inconsistent with Pickering and Garrod’s (2004; 
2013) proposal that speakers and listeners align at every level of linguistic representation 
in conversation. While language production is clearly influenced by previous language 
comprehension in dialogue (Haywood, Pickering, & Branigan, 2005; Heller & Chambers, 
! ! !!
! 107!
2013), my findings show that the memorial representations created during the processes 
of language comprehension and language production are distinct. The fact that memory 
for past referents varied on an item-by-item basis depending on a person’s role at the time 
in the conversation, and how that item was described, points to a high degree of 
flexibility (and variability) in how discourse referents will be encoded across the course 
of a conversation. This finding implies that successfully designing utterances based on 
the knowledge state of one’s addressee likely requires conversational partners to 
appreciate the fact that listener memory may be fleeting. In some cases then, a failure to 
assume common ground for previously discussed information may, in fact, reflect 
successful modeling of the listener’s mental state.  
In conclusion, the present research offers new insights into the mechanisms of 
conversation including how conversational partners use language in multiparty settings, 
and how memory and language interact to support conversational processes. This work 
also exemplifies how understanding the relevant memory processes involved in 
conversation is crucial for fleshing out a theory of how discourse history guides language 
use. This integrative approach to the study of language use in dialogue with measures of 
memory for the discourse history represents a key step forward in developing a unified 
theoretical framework of the cognitive processes underlying language use in conversation. 
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APPENDIX A: Model results for Chapter 2 
Statistical Analysis 
In Experiments 1-4, the statistical analyses focus on the length of the Director’s 
referring expressions (the number of words), as well as the fluency of the referring 
expression at test. In Experiment 2, I additionally examined whether the Director 
reconceptualized their expressions at test.  
Analyses of expression length used Poisson-link mixed effects models. Analyses 
of disfluency and reconceptualization used logit-link mixed effects models, which model 
the log odds of disfluency or reconceptualization, respectively. In all analyses, models 
were fit using the lmer package in R, with the maximal random effects structure for 
subjects and items. In cases where the maximal model did not converge, a backwards-
fitting procedure was used to identify the model with the largest random effects structure 
that would converge (see Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). Fixed effects were coded 
with mean-centered Helmert contrasts.  
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Table A.1. Experiment 1 test trials. Mixed effect model with degree of common ground and recency as fixed effects.  
The dependent measure is the number of words in the referring expression at test. 
 Estimate SE z-value p-value         Variance   Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) 1.721 0.092 18.674 <.0001   Subject (Intercept) 0.138 0.372 
CG -0.033 0.038 -0.854 0.393  CG 0.007 0.085 
Recency -0.005 0.326 -0.152 0.879  Recency 0.007 0.084 
CG*Recency 0.166 0.053 3.132 0.002   Trial (Intercept) 0.091 0.302 
      CG 0.011 0.103 
      Recency <.001 0.011 
      CG*Recency 0.038 0.196 
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Table A.2. Experiment 1 Disfluency. Mixed effect model with degree of common ground and recency as fixed effects. 
The dependent measure (binary) is whether the expression was fluent or not. 
 Estimate SE z-value p-value         Variance   Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) -0.931 0.305 -3.049 0.002   Subject (Intercept)   1.679 1.296 
CG -0.246 0.154 -1.595 0.111  CG 0.016 0.127 
Recency -0.230 0.149 -1.545 0.122  Recency 0.047 0.217 
CG*Recency 0.106 0.403 0.263 0.792  CG*Recency 1.604 1.266 
       Trial (Intercept) 0.223 0.472 
      CG 0.041 0.202 
      Recency 0.039 0.198 
      CG*Recency 0.000 0.008 
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Table A.3. Experiment 2 test trials:Reference Length. Mixed effect model with repetition and partner (High CG, Low CG, High+Low 
CG) as fixed effects. The dependent measure is the number of words in each referential expression at test. 
 Estimate SE z-value p-value       Variance Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) 1.773 0.073 24.397 <.0001   Subject (Intercept)   0.092 0.304 
Repetition 0.325 0.071 4.586 <.0001  Repetition 0.050 0.223 
Partner1  
(High vs. Low & High+Low) 
0.557 0.083 6.751 <.0001 
 
 Partner1 0.117 0.342 
Partner2 (Low vs. High+Low) 0.072 0.062 1.158 0.247  Partner2 0.061 0.247 
Repetition*Partner1 0.329 0.054 6.072 <0.001   Trial (Intercept) 0.047 0.216 
Repetition*Partner2 0.087 0.051 1.696 0.090  Repetition 0.085 0.291 
      Partner1 0.011 0.107 
      Partner2 0.021 0.146 
      Repetition*Partner1 0.085 0.292 
      Repetition*Partner2 0.019 0.137 
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Table A.4. Experiment 2 test trials: Reference Length. Mixed effect model with repetition and partner (High/Low CG switching) as 
fixed effects. The dependent measure is the number of words in each referential expression at test. 
 Estimate SE z-value p-value       Variance Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) 1.835 0.081 22.614 <.0001   Subject (Intercept)   0.114 0.338 
Repetition 0.102 0.060 1.717 0.086  Repetition 0.004 0.064 
Partner  
(High-Switching vs. 
Low-Switching) 
0.615 0.088 7.019 <.0001  Partner 0.161 0.341 
Repetition*Partner 0.104 0.092 1.125 0.261  Repetition*Partner 0.032 0.178 
       Trial (Intercept) <.0001 <.0001 
      Repetition 0.289 0.538 
      Partner <.001 0.003 
      Repetition*Partner 0.351 0.593 
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Table A.5. Experiment 2 test trials: Disfluency. Mixed effect model with repetition and condition (High CG, Low CG, High+Low CG) 
as fixed effects. The dependent measure (binary) is whether the expression was fluent or not. 
 Estimate SE z-value 
p-value 
      Variance Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) -0.877 0.255 -3.443 0.001   Subject (Intercept) 0.326 0.571 
Repetition 1.401 0.279 5.020 <.0001  Repetition 0.096 0.309 
Partner1  
(High vs. Low & High+Low) 
3.102 0.456 6.810 <.0001  Partner1 0.736 0.858 
Partner 2 (Low vs. High+Low) 0.171 0.266 0.644 0.520  Partner2 0.142 0.377 
Repetition*Partner1 2.623 0.577 4.547 <.0001   Trial (Intercept) 0.301 0.549 
Repetition*Partner2 -0.122 0.450 -0.270 0.787  Repetition 0.583 0.764 
      Partner1 0.853 0.924 
      Partner2 0.051 0.226 
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Table A.6. Experiment 2 test trials: Disfluency. Mixed effect model with repetition and condition (High/Low CG switching condition) 
as fixed effects. The dependent measure (binary) is whether the expression was fluent or not. 
 Estimate SE z-value p-value         Variance Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) -0.325 0.230 -1.414 0.157   Subject (Intercept) 0.494 0.703 
Repetition 0.365 0.285 1.283 0.200  Repetition 0.013 0.113 
Partner  
(high-switching vs. 
low-switching) 
2.969 0.346 8.585 <.0001  Partner 0.000 0.019 
Repetition*Partner 0.689 0.624 1.104 0.270   Trial (Intercept) 0.123 0.351 
      Repetition 0.513 0.716 
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Table A.7. Experiment 2 test trials: Reference reconceptualization. Mixed effect model with repetition and condition (High CG, Low 
CG, High+Low CG) as fixed effects. The dependent measure (binary) is whether the expression was reconceptualized or not. 
 Estimate SE z-value p-value       Variance Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) -0.264 0.243 -1.084 0.278   Subject (Intercept) 0.919 0.959 
Repetition 0.560 0.356 1.574 0.116  Repetition 1.469 1.212 
Partner1 (High vs. Low & 
High+Low) 
2.245 0.279 8.039 <.001 
 Partner1 1.154 1.074 
Partner 2 (Low vs. High+Low) 0.516 0.218 2.361 0.018  Partner2 0.520 0.721 
Repetition*Partner1 0.195 0.272 0.716 0.474   Trial (Intercept) 0.528 0.727 
Repetition*Partner2 0.442 0.283 1.565 0.118  Repetition 2.662 1.631 
      Partner1 0.050 0.228 
      Partner2 0.049 0.221 
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Table A.8. Experiment 2 test trials: Reconceptualization. Mixed effect model with repetition and condition (High/Low CG switching 
condition) as fixed effects. The dependent measure (binary) is whether the expression was reconceptualized or not. 
 Estimate SE z-value p-value         Variance Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) -0.270 0.248 -1.089 0.276   Subject (Intercept) 0.954 0.977 
Repetition 0.603 0.246 1.259 0.158  Repetition 0.135 0.367 
Partner  
(high-switching vs. 
low-switching) 
2.335 0.266 8.793 <.0001  Partner 0.474 0.688 
Repetition*Partner 0.727 0.426 0.704 0.388  Repetition*Partner 0.092 0.304 
       Trial (Intercept) 0.433 0.658 
      Repetition 0.013 0.113 
      Partner 0.382 0.618 
      Repetition*Partner 0.175 0.418 
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Table A.9. Experiment 3a test trials: Reference Length. Mixed effect model with degree of common ground as a fixed effect.  
The dependent measure is the number of words in the referring expression at test. 
 Estimate SE z-value p-value       Variance  Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) 2.112 0.073 29.646 <.0001   Subject (Intercept)   0.104 0.322 
CG1 (K vs. 2K1N, 1K2N, N) 0.069 0.067 10.261 <.0001  CG1 0.095 0.307 
CG2 (2K1N vs. 1K2N, N) 0.179 0.051 3.541 <.001  CG2 0.051 0.226 
CG3 (1K2N vs. N) 0.063 0.064 0.984 0.325  CG3 0.088 0.297 
       Trial (Intercept) 0.081 0.285 
      CG1 0.095 0.307 
      CG2 0.051 0.226 
      CG3 0.088 0.297 
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Table A.10. Experiment 3a test trials: Disfluency. Mixed effect model with degree of common ground as a fixed effect. 
The dependent measure (binary) is whether the expression was fluent or not. 
 Estimate SE z-value p-value       Variance  Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) 0.339 
0.251 
1.350 
0.177 
  Subject (Intercept) 
 1.462 
1.209 
CG1 (K vs. 2K1N, 1K2N, N) 1.882 0.205 9.169 <.0001  CG1 0.330 0.575 
CG2 (2K1N vs. 1K2N, N) 0.597 0.266 2.247 0.025  CG2 1.253 1.119 
CG3 (1K2N vs. N) 0.321 0.216 1.483 0.138  CG3 0.249 0.499 
       Trial (Intercept) 0.390 0.625 
      CG1 0.258 0.508 
      CG2 0.007 0.086 
      CG3 0.054 0.232 
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Table A.11. Experiment 3b test trials: Reference Length. Mixed effect model with degree of common ground as a fixed effect.  
The dependent measure is the number of words in the referring expression at test. 
 Estimate SE z-value p-value       Variance Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) 2.068 0.058 35.48 <.0001   Subject (Intercept)   0.077 0.278 
CG1 
(K vs. 3K1N, 2K2N, 1K3N, N) 
0.719 0.048 15.13 <.0001  CG1 0.044 0.211 
CG2  
(3K1N vs. 2K2N, 1K3N, N) 
0.100 0.041 2.43 0.015  CG2 0.045 0.212 
CG3 (2K2N vs. 1K3N, N) 0.042 0.051 0.83 0.406  CG3 0.072 0.267 
CG4 (1K3N vs. N) 0.068 0.041 1.65 0.098  CG4 0.037 0.193 
       Trial (Intercept) 0.091 0.301 
      CG1 0.034 0.183 
      CG2 0.008 0.087 
      CG3 0.012 0.108 
      CG4 0.014 0.117 
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Table A.12. Experiment 3b test trials: Disfluency. Mixed effect model with degree of common ground as a fixed effect. 
The dependent measure (binary) is whether the expression was fluent or not. 
 Estimate SE z-value p-value       Variance Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) -0.129 0.243 -0.532 0.595   Subject (Intercept) 
  1.845 
1.358 
CG1 
(K vs. 3K1N, 2K2N, 1K3N, N) 
1.413 0.252 5.607 <.0001  CG1 1.518 1.232 
CG2  
(3K1N vs. 2K2N, 1K3N, N) 
0.366 0.161 2.280 0.022  CG2 0.336 0.580 
CG3 (2K2N vs. 1K3N, N) 0.328 0.198 1.657 0.098  CG3 0.738 0.859 
CG4 (1K3N vs. N) 0.497 0.208 2.389 0.017  CG4 0.602 0.776 
       Trial (Intercept) 0.274 0.523 
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Table A.13. Experiment 4 test trials: Reference Length. Mixed effect model with visual context as a fixed effect (Context1: (4) M1-
complex/M2-simple vs. (1) Same-context, (2) M1-simple/M2-baseline, & (3) M1-baseline/M2-simple; Context2: (3) M1-baseline/M2-
simple vs. (1) Same-context, & (2) M1-simple/M2-baseline; Context3: (1) Same-context vs. (2) M1-simple/M2-baseline). The 
dependent measure is the number of words in the referring expression at test. 
 Estimate SE z-value p-value       Variance  Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) 2.621 0.047 55.56 <.0001   Subject (Intercept)   0.048 0.219 
Context1 
(4) vs. (1),(2),(3) 
-0.380 0.045 -8.44 <.0001  Context1 0.025 0.220 
Context2 
(3) vs. (1),(2) 
0.192 0.041 4.67 <.0001  Context2 0.023 0.150 
Context3  
(1) vs. (2) 
0.054 0.041 1.33 0.185  Context3 0.012 0.112 
       Trial (Intercept) 0.030 0.172 
      Context1 0.060 0.244 
      Context2 0.037 0.193 
      Context3 0.057 0.239 
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Table A.14. Experiment 4 test trials: Disfluency. Mixed effect model with visual context as a fixed effect. (Context1: (4) M1-
complex/M2-simple vs. (1) Same-context, (2) M1-simple/M2-baseline, & (3) M1-baseline/M2-simple; Context2: (3) M1-baseline/M2-
simple vs. (1) Same-context, & (2) M1-simple/M2-baseline; Context3: (1) Same-context vs. (2) M1-simple/M2-baseline). The 
dependent measure (binary) is whether the expression was fluent or not. 
 Estimate SE z-value p-value   Variance Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) 1.040 0.263 3.952 <.0001   Subject (Intercept)   1.770 1.330 
Context1        
(4) vs. (1),(2),(3) 
-1.701 0.240 -7.076 <.0001  Context1 0.546 0.739 
Context2        
(3) vs. (1),(2) 
0.330 0.150 2.187 0.028  Context2 0.015 0.122 
Context3  
(1) vs. (2) 
0.053 0.171 0.311 0.756  Context3 0.038 0.194 
       Trial (Intercept) 0.072 0.269 
      Context1 0.273 0.523 
      Context2 0.156 0.395 
      Context3 0.033 0.180 
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APPENDIX B: Model results for Chapter 3 
 
Table B.1. Experiment 5: Mixed effect model with entrainment type during the communication task as a fixed effect. The dependent 
measure is binary whether the expression on test trial was modified or not. (NC: Non-contrast, CN: Contrast-naming, CL: Contrast-
location)  
 Estimate SE z-value Pr(>|z|)        Variance  Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) -2.047 0.278 -7.362 <0.001   Subject (Intercept) 1.371 1.171 
Entrainment 1 
(NC vs. CN & CL) 
0.439 0.120 2.194 0.028  Entrainment 1 0.103 0.320 
Entrainment 2  
(CN vs. CL) 
0.014 0.211 0.067 0.946  Entrainment 2 0.011 0.107 
       Trial (Intercept) 0.959 0.979 
      Entrainment 1 0.009 0.094 
      Entrainment 2 0.059 0.243 
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Table B.2. Experiment 5: Mixed effect model with role, referent, and entrainment type in memory test as fixed effects. The dependent 
measure is binary whether the response on memory test was correct or not.  
 Estimate SE z-value Pr(>|z|)       Variance  Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) 3.508 0.138 25.354 <.0001   Subject (Intercept)   0.138 0.372 
Role (Speaker vs. Listener) 0.749 0.269 2.781 0.005  Role 1.584 1.259 
Referent (Target vs. Contrast) -1.490 0.288 -5.173 <.0001  Referent 0.932 0.965 
Entrainment 1 
(NC vs. CN & CL) 
0.227 0.189 1.199 0.231  Entrainment 1 0.191 0.437 
Entrainment 2  
(CN vs. CL) 
0.237 0.214 1.106 0.269  Entrainment 2 0.147 0.383 
Role*Referent 1.088 0.351 3.099 0.002   Trial (Intercept) 0.360 0.560 
Role*Entrainment 1 0.008 0.334 0.023 0.982  Role 0.017 0.130 
Role*Entrainment 2 0.392 0.407 0.962 0.336  Referent 0.264 0.514 
Referent*Entrainment 1 -0.471 0.351 -1.340 0.180  Entrainment 1 0.151 0.388 
Referent*Entrainment 2 -0.479 0.409 -1.172 0.241  Entrainment 2 0.017 0.129 
Role*Referent*Entrainment 1 -1.277 0.661 -1.930 0.054     
Role*Referent*Entrainment 2 -0.318 0810 -0.392 0.695     
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Table B.3. Experiment 5: Mixed effect model with role and entrainment type for contrast item in memory test as fixed effects. The 
dependent measure is binary whether the response on memory test was correct or not. 
 Estimate SE z-value Pr(>|z|)       Variance    Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) 4.855 0.265 18.328 <.0001   Subject (Intercept)  0.392 0.626 
Role (Speaker vs. Listener) -0.071 0.523 -0.136 0.892  Role 5.652 2.377 
Entrainment 1 
(NC vs. CN & CL) 
0.092 0.454 0.202 0.840  Entrainment 1 0.761 0.872 
Entrainment 2 
(CN vs. CL) 
0.358 0.422 0.849 0.396  Entrainment 2 1.064 1.032 
Role*Entrainment 1 1.114 0.646 1.723 0.085   Trial (Intercept) 0.626 0.791 
Role*Entrainment 2 0.860 0.787 1.093 0.274  Role 0.028 0.167 
      Entrainment 1 2.338 1.529 
      Entrainment 2 0.097 0.312 
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Table B.4. Experiment 5: Mixed effect model with role and entrainment type for target item in memory test as fixed effects. The 
dependent measure is binary whether the response on memory test was correct or not. 
 Estimate SE z-value Pr(>|z|)        Variance    Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) 2.775 0.155 17.951 <.0001   Subject (Intercept)   0.255 0.505 
Role (Speaker vs. Listener) 1.450 0.258 5.616 <.0001  Role 1.043 1.021 
Entrainment 1 
(NC vs. CN & CL) 
-0.126 0.207 -0.609 0.542  Entrainment 1 0.297 0.545 
Entrainment 2  
(CN vs. CL) 
-0.018 0.213 -0.083 0.933  Entrainment 2 0.189 0.435 
Role*Entrainment 1 -0.708 0.366 -1.934 0.053   Trial (Intercept) 0.281 0.530 
Role*Entrainment 2 0.155 0.400 0.388 0.698  Role 0.189 0.435 
      Entrainment 1 0.023 0.151 
      Entrainment 2 0.001 0.025 
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Table B.5. Experiment 6: Mixed effect model with entrainment type and lag during the communication task as fixed effects. The 
dependent measure is binary whether the expression on test trial was modified or not. 
 Estimate SE z-value Pr(>|z|)         Variance    Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) -1.869 0.264 -7.072 <.0001   Subject (Intercept) 1.443 1.201 
Lag (1 vs. 10 trial) 0.139 0.171 0.814 0.416  Lag 0.409 0.640 
Entrainment 1 
(NC vs. CNM & C) 
0.388 0.170 2.270 0.023  Entrainment 1 0.185 0.430 
Entrainment 2  
(CNM vs. C) 
0.038 0.187 0.203 0.839  Entrainment 2 0.261 0.511 
Lag*Entrainment 1 -0.357 0.304 -1.175 0.240  Lag*Entrainment 1 0.041 0.203 
Lag*Entrainment 2 -0.383 0.336 -1.143 0.251  Lag*Entrainment 2 0.167 1.091 
       Trial (Intercept) 1.190 1.091 
      Lag 0.022 0.147 
      Entrainment 1 0.060 0.246 
      Entrainment 2 0.037 0.191 
      Lag*Entrainment 1 0.024 0.154 
      Lag*Entrainment 2 0.049 0.220 
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Table B.6. Experiment 6: Mixed effect model with role, referent, and entrainment type in memory test as fixed effects. The dependent 
measure is binary whether the response on memory test was correct or not.  
 Estimate SE z-value Pr(>|z|)       Variance Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) 2.746 0.101 27.169 <.0001   Subject (Intercept)   0.376 0.613 
Role (Speaker vs. Listener) 0.577 0.138 4.181 <.0001  Role 0.730 0.854 
Referent (Target vs. Contrast) 0.248 0.162 1.527 0.127  Referent 0.196 0.443 
Entrainment 1 
(NC vs. CN & CL) 
-0.403 0.158 -2.552 0.011  Entrainment 1 0.147 0.384 
Entrainment 2  
(CN vs. CL) 
0.473 0.129 3.677 0.000  Entrainment 2 0.314 0.561 
Role*Referent 0.341 0.203 1.677 0.093   Trial (Intercept) 0.186 0.431 
Role*Entrainment 1 -0.366 0.202 -1.815 0.070  Role 0.139 0.373 
Role*Entrainment 2 0.399 0.213 1.873 0.061  Referent 0.304 0.551 
Referent*Entrainment 1 -0.103 0.304 -0.339 0.735  Entrainment 1 0.862 0.928 
Referent*Entrainment 2 -0.543 0.225 -2.413 0.016  Entrainment 2 0.085 0.291 
Role*Referent*Entrainment 1 0.439 0.399 1.100 0.271     
Role*Referent*Entrainment 2 -0.693 0.421 -1.646 0.010     
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Table B.7. Experiment 6: Mixed effect model with role and entrainment type for contrast item in memory test as fixed effects. The 
dependent measure is binary whether the response on memory test was correct or not.  
 Estimate SE z-value Pr(>|z|)        Variance Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) 2.756 0.141 19.587 <.0001   Subject (Intercept)   0.551 0.742 
Role 0.444 0.181 2.456 0.014  Role 1.084 1.041 
Entrainment 1 
(NC vs. CN & CL) 
-0.222 0.261 -0.850 0.395  Entrainment 1 0.008 0.090 
Entrainment 2  
(CN vs. CL) 
0.803 0.223 3.605 0.000  Entrainment 2 1.586 1.260 
Role*Entrainment 1 -0.470 0.276 -1.707 0.088   Trial (Intercept) 0.294 0.542 
Role*Entrainment 2 1.017 0.309 3.292 0.001  Role 0.122 0.349 
      Entrainment 1 1.619 1.272 
      Entrainment 2 0.183 0.428 
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Table B.8. Experiment 6: Mixed effect model with role and entrainment type for target item in memory test as fixed effects. The 
dependent measure is binary whether the response on memory test was correct or not. 
 Estimate SE z-value Pr(>|z|)       Variance Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) 2.955 0.121 24.338 <.0001   Subject (Intercept)   0.342 0.584 
Role 0.789 0.205 3.842 0.000  Role 1.328 1.152 
Entrainment 1 
(NC vs. CN & CL) 
-0.328 0.185 -1.780 0.075  Entrainment 1 0.250 0.450 
Entrainment 2  
(CN vs. CL) 
0.139 0.207 0.671 0.502  Entrainment 2 0.888 0.942 
Role*Entrainment 1 -0.453 0.303 -1.495 0.135   Trial (Intercept) 0.201 0.448 
Role*Entrainment 2 0.053 0.321 0.167 0.867  Referent 0.244 0.493 
      Entrainment 1 0.283 0.532 
      Entrainment 2 0.249 0.499 
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Table B.9. Experiment 7: Mixed effect model with entrainment type during the communication task as a fixed effect. The dependent 
measure is binary whether the expression on test trial was modified or not. 
 Estimate SE z-value Pr(>|z|)         Variance    Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) -1.670 0.203 -8.356 <.0001   Subject (Intercept) 0.526 0.725 
Entrainment 1 
(NC vs. CN & CL) 
0.637 0.155 4.116 <.0001  Entrainment 1 0.059 0.243 
Entrainment 2  
(CN vs. CL) 
0.277 0.154 1.798 0.072  Entrainment 2 0.003 0.054 
       Trial (Intercept) 0.885 0.940 
      Entrainment 1 0.023 0.152 
      Entrainment 2 0.001 0.023 
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Table B.10. Experiment 7 target memory: Mixed effect model with role, entrainment, and item type as fixed effects. The dependent 
measure is binary -- whether the response on the memory test was ‘yes’ (old) or ‘no’ (new). 
 Estimate SE z-value Pr(>|z|)       Variance Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) (response bias) 0.647 0.088 7.334 <.0001   Subject (Intercept)   0.385 0.621 
(effect on response bias)      Role 0.001 0.033 
Role  -0.185 0.064 -2.888 0.004  Item 1.077 1.038 
Entrainment 1 
(NC vs. CN & CL)  
0.116 0.086 1.346 0.178   Trial (Intercept) 0.113 0.337 
Entrainment 2  
(CN vs. CL)  
-0.042 0.085 -0.490 0.624  Role 0.003 0.052 
Role*Entrainment 1 -0.048 0.142 -0.337 0.736  Item 0.726 0.852 
Role*Entrainment 2 0.030 0.150 0.197 0.843     
         
Item (old vs. new) 
(sensitivity) 
-2.802 0.162 -17.267 <.0001     
(effect on sensitivity)         
Item*Role -0.381 0.129 -2.961 0.003     
Item*Entrainment 1 1.222 0.172 7.113 <.0001     
Item*Entrainment 2 -0.004 0.170 -0.021 0.983     
Item*Role*Entrainment 1  -0.167 0.284 -0.587 0.557     
Item*Role*Entrainment 2 -0.389 0.300 -1.297 0.195     
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Table B.11. Experiment 7 contrast memory: Mixed effect model with role, entrainment, and item type as fixed effects. The dependent 
measure is binary -- whether the response on the memory test was ‘yes’ (old) or ‘no’ (new).  
 Estimate SE z-value Pr(>|z|)       Variance Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) (response bias) 0.491 0.088 5.564 <.0001   Subject (Intercept)   0.349 0.590 
(effect on response bias)      Role 0.011 0.103 
Role  -0.099 0.069 -1.441 0.149  Item 1.056 1.028 
Entrainment 1 
(NC vs. CN & CL)  
0.256 0.087 2.932 0.003   Trial (Intercept) 0.194 0.440 
Entrainment 2  
(CN vs. CL)  
-0.908 0.091 -9.948 <.0001  Role 0.017 0.130 
Role*Entrainment 1 0.158 0.142 1.112 0.266  Item 0.528 0.726 
Role*Entrainment 2 -0.446 0.161 -2.771 0.006     
         
Item (old vs. new) 
(sensitivity) 
-2.994 0.166 -18.018 <.0001     
(effect on sensitivity)         
Item*Role -0.477 0.136 -3.503 <.001     
Item*Entrainment 1 0.690 0.173 3.964 <.0001     
Item*Entrainment 2 -1.754 0.182 -9.618 <.0001     
Item*Role*Entrainment 1  0.580 0.283 2.046 0.041     
Item*Role*Entrainment 2 -0.550 0.322 -1.706 0.088     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! ! !!
! 146!
Table B.12. Experiment 7 context memory: Mixed effect model with role, entrainment, and item type as fixed effects. The dependent 
measure is binary -- whether the response on the memory test was ‘yes’ (old) or ‘no’ (new). 
 Estimate SE z-value Pr(>|z|)       Variance Std.Dev. 
Fixed      Random     
(intercept) (response bias) 1.032 0.088 11.789 <.0001   Subject (Intercept)   0.360 0.599 
(effect on response bias)      Role 0.020 0.143 
Role  0.287 0.082 3.518 <.001  Item 0.147 0.383 
Entrainment (CN vs. CL)  -0.726 0.085 -8.508 <.0001   Trial (Intercept) 0.098 0.313 
Role*Entrainment  -0.380 0.153 -2.486 0.013  Role 0.062 0.249 
      Item 0.488 0.699 
Item (old vs. new) 
(sensitivity) 
-1.726 0.131 -13.189 <.0001   
 
 
(effect on sensitivity)         
Item*Role -0.028 0.161 -0.173 0.862     
Item*Entrainment  -1.540 0.168 -9.162 <.0001     
Item*Role*Entrainment -0.249 0.306 -0.815 0.415     
 
 
